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ABSTRACT 
 
Well integrity is defined as:” the application of technical, operational and organizational 
solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids, throughout the life 
cycle of a well” (1). 
An uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons to the surroundings may have devastating 
consequences involving loss of lives, environmental damage and huge economic impact. 
Therefore it is extremely important that the integrity is assured at all times. A two barrier 
criterion is required for all the wells on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in contact with an 
over pressured reservoir. The dual barrier envelopes shall reduce the risk of a hydrocarbon 
leak to the surroundings. 
The highest risk for a major accident is experienced and considered to be during drilling 
and well operations, and not in the production / injection phase. However, history clearly 
shows the risk for a blowout / well release from wells that have been in production with the 
Bravo and Snorre A blowouts as serious examples. With today’s extended well lifetime, the 
integrity in the operational phase needs increased focus as the failure rate in old wells may 
become more frequent.   
To have overview and control of the wells in operation a categorization system for well 
integrity was developed in Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Guidelines 117, chapter 
4. This system is based on the condition and number of barriers in a well, thus it is in direct 
association with the probability of a leak to the surroundings. Operators on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf have used this system as a basis when developing their own risk status 
codes, but there is a common interest for a categorization system that captures the total risk 
picture in a better way. By only looking into the physical barrier status of the wells, an 
important part of the overall risk is left out. The leak is not quantified (above the 
acceptance criteria), if it is serious or insignificant, and the potential consequences of the 
leak are not taken into consideration. Statoil is one of the operators realizing the need for a 
risk status code that includes these aspects. They have experienced difficulties when 
ranking and prioritizing wells outside the dual barrier criterion, and are interested in a 
system for further differentiation of the most critical wells. In this way the most risky wells 
can be prioritized first and evaluated in a more detailed risk assessment.  
 
 
The main scope of this thesis is suggesting a categorization system describing the overall 
risk in a better way than the existing. This is done by implementing the potential 
consequences as a second dimension in addition to the barrier status. Risk can be defined as 
the combination of the probability of an event and the associated consequences, and a status 
including both these elements will give a better description of the overall risk. As the main 
task is producing a new classification system for the consequences, this will be the part 
emphasized in the suggested models. In combination with the existing barrier status codes 
(based on the color codes in Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Guidelines 117 for 
Well Integrity) this gives a status which represents a more complete risk picture.  
This thesis suggests several systems for consequence categorization, and the one most 
representative is presented as model 3. By testing it on 5 field cases, the results clearly 
show why the new system gives a better description of the overall risk contra the existing.  
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1. 0BINTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of well safety has been recognized and accepted for a long time, and 
improvements concerning design and operating procedures have been made. Despite this, 
failures still occur and will continue to occur in the future. The gas blowout on the Snorre 
tension leg platform in 2004 exemplifies the need for continued focus on well safety. 
According to the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) the blowout could have resulted in a 
major accident with the loss of many lives. Deficient assessment of overall risk and breach 
of requirements to well barriers were two of the conclusions drawn from the PSA 
investigation (2). 
A number of serious well failures in recent years, with the Snorre event in 2004 as a major 
contributor, have led to an increased focus on well integrity. In 2006 PSA performed a pilot 
well integrity survey on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). This survey was based on 
supervisory audits and requested input from seven operating companies - one of them being 
Statoil ASA. 12 preselected offshore facilities and 406 production and injection wells, with 
variation of age and development categories, were investigated.  
PSA had experienced shortcomings in the industry’s handling of well integrity 
management, and the scope of the survey was to analyze how comprehensive the well 
integrity problems on the NCS were.  Main issues and challenges, especially related to the 
barrier status of the wells, should be brought to light.  
The common report from the pilot survey showed that the findings and improvements 
identified were the same for all the operators, and some of the key results were (3): 
 
• 18 % of the investigated production and injection wells were to some degree 
impaired by well integrity issues, including 7 % full shut in. The impairments 
clearly represented a generous potential for improvements both to health, safety and 
environment (HSE) and production. 
• Each company generally needed to improve focus on well integrity issues. 
• Well integrity and the dual barrier concept needed common attention from the 
industry in order to comply with the regulations, and thereby reducing the potential 
for well related accidents. 
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• Improved attention on verification and monitoring of well barriers was needed. 
• There was a need to align with a common way of documenting well integrity within 
the industry. The methods for describing the well barriers / envelopes varied in the 
industry and even within the same operating company. 
The operating companies were positive to the PSA findings, and there was a common 
understanding and agreement that well integrity was an arena that required improved 
attention.  
Based on the findings and identified improvements submitted in the pilot survey report 
from the PSA, the operators initiated an operators cooperation forum called Well Integrity 
Forum (WIF). WIF has been active since 2007 and is facilitated by Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Association and reports to Drilling Managers Forum (DMF). Since 2007 WIF has 
developed Norwegian Oil and Gas (NOG) Recommended Guidelines 117 for Well 
Integrity.  
The NOG Guidelines 117, chapter 4, describes a system for classifying a well based on its 
integrity status. Operators benefit from this categorization system as a method of ranking 
well integrity for wells in operation, whereas the PSA use it to summarize well integrity 
across the entire NCS. A common categorization system also promotes a level of 
consistency among the various operators when evaluating the integrity of their wells. 
The system principle is based on number of well barriers, thus it has a direct association 
with the probability of a leak to surface / environment. However, it does not quantify the 
leak (above the acceptance criteria), if it is insignificant or serious or the potential 
consequences of the leak. In this way it does not give a total risk picture for the different 
wells. For instance, two wells with only one remaining barrier can pose different levels of 
risks if one is a high rate gas well on a manned platform whereas the second is a subsea 
water injector.  
Statoil has developed several systems based on the NOG Guidelines 117, included the 
newly implemented system Intetech Well Integrity Toolkit (iWIT), but none of them seems 
to capture the total risk picture in a good enough way. Operators, with Statoil in the lead, 
and the PSA realize the need for an improved system for well categorization reflecting the 
total risk picture for a well in operation and not only the barrier status.   
The scope of this thesis will be to describe and evaluate the existing systems for well 
integrity well categorization for the operational phase. Improvements for defining risk 
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status codes and how to perform specific risk assessments for the most critical wells will be 
suggested. Hopefully this will contribute to a better way of ranking and prioritizing the 
most critical wells with regards to well integrity issues and to an improved understanding 
of the risks that can cause undesirable events.  
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2. 1BTHEORY 
 
2.1 9BWell system description 
 
This chapter will give a short description of the main characteristics of an offshore well in 
the operational phase. 
 
2.1.1 21BWell operational phase  
 
The operational phase of a well is considered to extend from handover of the well after 
construction to handover prior to abandonment and is illustrated in figure 1. Handover is 
the process of transferring responsibility for operating a well from one party to another, 
including both custody to operate and the data and documents which describe the well 
construction (4). The operational phase (production / injection) starts after the well 
construction organization has handed the well over to the production organization and ends 
with a handover back to drilling and well (D&W) organization for intervention, workover 
or abandonment (1). Figure 1 shows the cycle of handovers in a well’s lifetime.   
  
Figure 1: Well operational phase (4). 
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2.1.2 22BWell system 
 
The main components of a well are casing program, well completion, wellhead and x - mas 
tree (5): 
• The casing program consists of all casings and liner strings, including hangers and 
cement.  
• The wellhead is the seabed / surface termination of a wellbore with facilities for 
installing casing hangers during the well construction phase and for hanging the 
production tubing and installing the x - mas tree. 
• The x - mas tree is an assembly of valves, pressure gauges and chokes controlling 
well flow. 
• The well completion is the assembly of tubing hanger, tubing, safety valve, 
production packer, and other equipment placed inside the production casing / liner 
giving access to the reservoir. 
On a surface well the wellhead, x - mas tree and production control system are positioned 
on the platform. On subsea wells these systems are located at seabed and the produced 
fluids are transported to the platform through a flowline and riser. 
All wells contain valves which are constructed to shut in the well in an emergency situation 
- emergency shutdown (ESD) valves. These are typically the surface controlled subsurface 
safety valve (SCSSV), annulus master valve (AMV), production master valve (PMV) and 
production wing valve (PWV). The well safety valves are fail - safe, meaning they will 
close when hydraulic pressure or signal is lost. During production / injection they are kept 
in an open position, and it is critical that they automatically close in situations when power 
or hydraulic support is lost or if a fire occurs (5). 
Figure 2 illustrates a typical oil producing surface well. 
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Figure 2: Typical oil producing surface well (5). 
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2.1.3 23BWell types  
 
A well in operation may either be a producer or injector. Production wells produce 
reservoir fluids, while injection wells are used to inject gas or water into the reservoir to 
maintain / increase the pressure.  
The production well transports fluids from the reservoir to the process facilities on the 
installation. Typical fluids produced are oil, gas, condensate and water. In a naturally 
flowing production well the reservoir pressure is sufficient to produce hydrocarbons in a 
commercial rate. However, after a period of time the pressure may decrease and it is 
required with artificial lift to continue production. Artificial lift is when a system adds 
energy to the fluid column in a wellbore with the objective to improve production from the 
well. The most common principles used are gas lift and electrical submersible pumps. 
In a gas injection well, separated gas from production wells or imported gas is injected into 
the upper gas section of the reservoir. Water injection wells use filtered and treated 
seawater or produced water to inject into the lower water bearing section of the reservoir. 
The main purpose of the injectors is to maintain / increase reservoir pressure in order to get 
a higher recovery. 
The production and injection wells on the NCS must follow standards, laws and regulations 
for well integrity in order to be operated in a safe and legal way. These will be described in 
the following chapters. 
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2.2 10BStandards, laws and regulations for well integrity in 
Norway 
 
A standard is a publication that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or 
their results, for common and repeated use (6). 
International (developed by ISO), American (developed by API) and European standards 
(developed by CEN) form the basis of all activities in the petroleum industry. Experts from 
a wide range of Norwegian companies participate in the development of these, in order to 
define safe and economical design and processes. However, Norwegian safety framework 
and climate conditions may require own standards, or additions and supplements to 
International, (ISO), American (API) and European Standards (EN) (7). The NORSOK 
standards are developed to fulfil these needs. 
NORSOK D-010 “Well integrity in drilling and well operations” is developed by the 
Norwegian petroleum industry to ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost 
effectiveness for well integrity in Norway. It is a functional standard and sets the minimum 
requirements for the equipment / solutions to be used in a well, but leaves it up to the 
operating companies to choose the solutions that meet the requirements. In this way the 
companies develop their own sets of requirements and work processes that in minimum 
must follow NORSOK D-010. The preparation and publication of NORSOK D-010 is 
supported by Norwegian Oil and Gas Association and Federation of Norwegian Industries, 
and is issued by Standards Norway.   
Figure 3 illustrates that above all standards are the Norwegian laws, regulations and 
guidelines which are the overriding requirements to be followed. Petroleum activity in 
Norway is based on the “Regulations relating to Health, Environment and Safety in 
petroleum activities” (Framework Regulations) issued by PSA. PSA serve as regulator for 
technical and operational safety, emergency preparedness and the working environment in 
all phases in the petroleum industry. They are subordinate to the Ministry of Labor and 
Social affairs as figure 3 shows. 
Regarding well integrity aspects the Facilities Regulations (relating to design and outfitting 
of facilities in the petroleum activities) and the Activity Regulations (relating to conducting 
petroleum activities) are the most important.  
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Figure 3: Laws, regulations and guidelines controlling the petroleum industry in Norway and the national 
organization of the petroleum sector in Norway. 
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For the operators on the NCS there is a requirement of having a system in place for 
managing the well integrity for the life cycle of all their wells. The intention with this 
system is to control and reduce the risk of incidents related to the wells. A well integrity 
management (WIM) system is a combination of technical, operational and organizational 
processes to assure a well’s integrity (8). A description of elements required in a WIM 
system can be found in Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended Guidelines 117 and is 
shown in figure 4. Whereas the Norwegian regulations refer to management systems in 
general, the specifics are left to each operator. The NOG Guidelines 117 provides some 
minimum criteria for WIM system based on a review of the Norwegian regulations and is 
intended as a supplementation to these.  
Statoil follows the ARIS management system, which contains a complete set of technical 
requirements, guidelines and description of work processes developed for onshore and 
offshore facilities engineering, including the well integrity discipline. ARIS describes how 
well integrity for the entire life cycle of a well shall be managed; however, the focus in this 
thesis is well integrity in the operational phase of a well.    
  
Figure 4: Elements in a WIM system (8). 
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2.3 11BWell Integrity fundamentals 
 
 
Well integrity is defined in NORSOK D-010 as:” the application of technical, operational 
and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids, 
throughout the life cycle of a well”. The primary purpose of well integrity is to maintain 
full control of fluids at all times to prevent unintended flow. 
 
2.3.1 24BWell barrier (WB) 
 
A well barrier (WB) is the corner stone of managing well integrity, and is an envelope of 
one or several dependent well barrier elements (WBE). These physical elements do not 
prevent flow alone, but form a closed system in combination with others. This system shall 
prevent fluids from flowing unintentionally from the formation into the wellbore, another 
formation or to the external environment. The well barriers shall be defined before an 
activity or operation by identifying the required well barrier elements to be in place, their 
specific acceptance criteria and monitoring method (1). This is also impaired in Norwegian 
law, in the regulations relating to conducting petroleum activities governed by the PSA. 
The Activities Regulations § 85 – Well barriers says (9): 
“During drilling and well activities, there shall be tested well barriers with sufficient 
independence. If a barrier fails, activities shall not be carried out in the well other than 
those intended to restore the barrier. When handing over wells, the barrier status shall be 
tested, verified and documented” 
Similar is found in The Facilities Regulations § 48 – Well barriers (10): 
“Well barriers shall be designed such that well integrity is ensured and the barrier 
functions are safeguarded during the well's lifetime. Well barriers shall be designed such 
that unintended well influx and outflow to the external environment is prevented, and such 
that they do not hinder well activities. When a well is temporarily or permanently 
abandoned, the barriers shall be designed such that they take into account well integrity for 
the longest period of time the well is expected to be abandoned. When plugging wells, it 
shall be possible to cut the casings without harming the surroundings. The well barriers 
shall be designed such that their performance can be verified”. 
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Primary well barrier is closest to the pressurized reservoir, and is the first envelope that 
prevents flow from a source. Secondary well barrier is the second envelope that prevents 
flow from a source if the primary fails. A simple sketch illustrating the barrier principle is 
shown in figure 5. The main rule states that two independent barrier envelopes against 
uncontrolled blowout from reservoirs shall at all times be in place if there are hydrocarbon - 
bearing over pressured formations (11). Two defined barriers shall to the extent possible be 
independent of each other without common barrier elements (12). Wells with no source of 
inflow / reservoir shall as a minimum have one mechanical well barrier (1). 
 
The well barriers shall be designed, selected and constructed with capability to (1): 
 
• Withstand the maximum differential pressure and temperature it may become 
exposed to (taking into account depletion or injection regimes in adjacent wells). 
• Be pressure tested, function tested or verified by other methods. 
• Ensure that no single failure of a well barrier or WBE can lead to uncontrolled flow 
of wellbore fluids or gases to the external environment. 
• Re - establish a lost well barrier or establish another alternative well barrier. 
• Operate competently and withstand the environment for which it may be exposed to 
over time. 
• Determine the physical position / location and integrity status at all times when such 
monitoring is possible. 
• Be independent of each other and avoid having common WBEs to the extent 
possible. 
 
An addition to the dual barrier principle seen in figure 5 is the requirement of a double 
block when the barrier element is in contact with the external environment. Valves in 
contact with the external (e.g. x - mas tree and annulus access valves) need to be in series of 
two preventing hydrocarbons from escaping the well. 
12 
 
  
 
 
2.3.2 25BWell barrier element (WBE)  
 
For a well barrier element to be considered operational, it should be verified and 
maintained through regular testing and maintenance. The location and integrity status of 
each well barrier element should be known at all times (11). 
For a well in operation, the primary well barrier envelope typically constitutes the 
following well barrier elements (4): 
• Cap rock above reservoir. 
• Casing cement. 
• Casing. 
• Production packer. 
• Tubing. 
• SCSSV. 
The secondary well barrier typically constitutes the following well barrier elements (4): 
• Formation above production packer. 
• Casing cement. 
Figure 5: Dual barrier principle. 
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• Casing with hanger and seal assembly. 
• Wellhead with valves. 
• Tubing hanger with seals. 
• Annulus access valve / line. 
• X - mas tree with valves and x - mas tree connection. 
The main WBEs for the operational phase are further described (function and failure mode) 
in appendix A.  
 
2.3.3 26BWell barrier schematic (WBS)  
 
A well barrier schematic (WBS) is a static illustration of the well and its main barrier 
elements, where the primary and secondary well barrier elements are marked with different 
colors. One of the PSA findings from the spring 2006 well integrity audit was the 
requirement for the creation of WBS for the operational phase of each individual well on 
the NCS. Each operating company worked to fulfil this requirement, and used the WBS 
presented in NORSOK D-010 as a basis.  
There shall be a well specific WBS for any planned drilling or well operation, for each 
operational phase and where there is a change to barrier envelope. The WBS shall describe 
planned position and method of verification for each well barrier element, since the actual 
position and status of the barrier / barrier element shall be known at all times. Any 
deviations or changes to the status shall be reflected in an updated schematic (12). 
NORSOK D-010 describes when a new WBS should be made: 
• When a new well component is acting as a WBE. 
• For illustration of the completed well with x –mas tree. 
• For recompletion or workover on wells. 
• For final status of permanently abandoned wells. 
 
 NORSOK D-010 also describes what information the WBS should contain: 
• A drawing illustrating the well barriers, with the primary well barrier shown with 
blue color and secondary well barrier shown with red color. 
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• The formation integrity when the formation is part of a well barrier. 
• Reservoirs and potential sources of inflow. 
• Tabulated listing of WBEs with initial verification and monitoring requirements. 
• All casings and cement. Casing and cement (including TOC) defined as WBEs 
should be labelled with its size and depth (TVD and MD). 
• Well information: field / installation, well name, well type, well status, well / 
section design pressure. 
• Revision number and date, “Prepared by”, “Verified / Approved by”. 
• Clear labelling of actual well barrier status – planned or as built. 
• Any failed or impaired WBE to be clearly stated. 
• A note field for important well integrity information (anomalies, exemptions, etc.). 
 
Well barrier schematics shall contain tables showing the WBEs that are found as primary or 
secondary barriers. A typical production well WBS from NORSOK D-010 with indicated 
WBEs and envelopes is illustrated in figure 6. The blue line indicates the primary barrier 
and includes cap rock, casing cement, casing, production packer, completion string and the 
SSCSV. The red line envelope indicates the secondary barrier and includes the formation at 
the intermediate casing, casing cement, casing, wellhead, annulus valves, tubing hanger and 
production tree with connectors and valves. 
Through this kind of illustration it is possible to verify the status of the barriers and identify 
issues. Future operation of the well is greatly dependent on these assessments and control 
and monitoring may be planned based on the schematics. Therefore it is very important that 
the WBSs are updated and quality checked at all times, especially during handovers.  
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Figure 6: WBS for a typical production well (1). 
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2.3.4 27BWell barrier element acceptance criteria  
 
Well barrier element acceptance criteria are technical and operational requirements and 
guidelines that need to be fulfilled in order to qualify the WBE for its intended use. These 
criteria could be leak rates, time to valve closure, fail - safe specification; etc. (4).Well 
barrier element criteria shall be in place for all WBEs used, and NORSOK D-010 has 
collated them in an element acceptance criteria - table (EAC - table). This table contains the 
minimum standards to be fulfilled, and does not replace the technical and functional 
requirements that the operating company specify for the equipment. Table 1 shows an 
example of a general EAC - table, and section 15 in NOROSK D-010 describes the criteria 
for each WBEs used throughout the lifecycle of a well. Appendix B in this thesis contains 
an excerpt from this, showing the most common WBEs during the operational phase.  
 
 
In general the acceptance criteria for leaks through seals that are defined as barrier elements 
are zero (unless specified otherwise in the EAC) to have a qualified WBE. However, in 
reality it would be impossible to maintain a zero rate of leakage under all circumstances 
and as time goes by. Acceptable leak rates shall satisfy at least all the following acceptance 
criteria (4): 
Table 1: General EAC – table (1).  
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• Leak across a valve, leak contained within the envelope or flow path: requirements 
in ISO 10417 need to be fulfilled (13). 
• Leak across a barrier envelope, conduit to conduit: not permitted unless the 
receiving conduit is able to withstand the potential newly imposed load and fluid 
composition. 
• No leak rate from conduit to conduit exceeding the leak rate specified in ISO 10417 
/ API RP 14B { (13), (14)}. 
• No unplanned or uncontrolled leak of hydrocarbons to the surface or subsurface 
environments. 
API RP 14B (bullet point 3) states acceptance criteria for leakage rate through a closed 
subsurface safety valve system (14): 
• 0.4 liters / min for liquid.  
• 0.42 m3 / min for gas. 
Statoil uses the API RP 14B criteria for all their WBEs. Leakage rates below these criteria 
have been assessed to have acceptable and manageable consequences. However, a leak 
directly to the external environment (seabed, surface) is not acceptable, and there is a zero 
rate requirement.  
From a leakage rate perspective a WBE can be failed, degraded or intact. The term failed is 
used when the WBE is leaking above the acceptance criteria, degraded when there is a leak 
below the acceptance criteria and intact when there is no leak through the barrier element. 
 
2.3.5 28BWell barrier element testing 
 
There are different tests to verify and monitor the WBEs, and these are described in the 
bullet points in this section (4):  
• Verification testing is a check whether a component meets its acceptance criteria, 
and includes (but is not limited to) function testing and leak testing. 
• Function testing is a check to whether or not a component or system is operating 
correctly. For example, the function test of a valve indicates that the valve opens 
and closes correctly. It does not provide information about possible leaking of the 
valve. 
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• Leak testing is the application of differential pressure to assure the integrity of the 
sealing system of the component. This can either be done by pressure or inflow 
testing. 
• Pressure testing is the application of a pressure from an external source (non- 
reservoir pressure) to assure the mechanical and sealing integrity of the component. 
• Inflow testing uses the tubing or casing pressure to perform leak testing of for 
example a valve. The valve that is tested is closed, the pressure downstream of the 
valve is reduced to create a pressure differential across the valve, and the volume 
downstream is monitored for a pressure increase that indicates a leak. 
 
2.3.6 29BVerifying well barriers 
 
Initial verification involves verifying the different WBEs being ready for use and accepted 
as a part of the well barrier.  
Initial verification of a well barrier shall be performed directly after it has been constructed 
or installed, and the function and integrity shall be verified by means of (12): 
• Leak testing by application of differential pressure. 
• Function testing of WBEs that require activation. 
• Verification by other specified methods. 
Re - verification of a well barrier shall be performed when (12): 
• The condition of the barrier could have been changed since the initial / previous 
testing.  
• There is a change in worst case loads / well design pressure (WDP) for the 
remaining life cycle of the wells. 
WDP is the highest pressure expected at surface / wellhead and shall be established based 
on reservoir pressure minus the hydrostatic pressure of gas plus kill margin, or maximum 
injection pressure for injection wells (1). 
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2.3.7 30BMonitoring well barriers 
 
Well barrier integrity during the production life of the well is monitored by registration of 
annulus pressure and frequent leak testing of WBEs. 
NORSOK D-010 specifies the following requirements: 
• Downhole safety valves, production tree valves and annulus valves shall be 
regularly leak tested. Leak test acceptance criteria shall be established and available. 
• The pressure in all accessible annuli shall be monitored. 
• Registered anomalies shall be investigated to determine the source of anomaly and 
if relevant, quantify any leak rate across the well barrier. 
• Upon confirmation of loss of the defined well barrier, the production or injection 
shall be suspended and shall not re - commence before the well barrier or an 
alternative well barrier is re - established. 
NORSOK D-010 states that pressures in all accessible annuli shall be monitored and 
maintained within minimum and maximum operational pressure range limits. Well 
parameters such as temperatures and rates shall also be monitored to give a correct picture 
of pressure trends and identification of abnormal pressure behavior. Any change of annulus 
pressure, increase or decrease, can be indicative of an integrity issue. The well operating 
pressure limits should be based on the specifications of the components that make up the 
well. Any changes in well configuration, condition, life cycle phase or status requires the 
well operating limits to be checked and potentially updated.  
The maximum allowable annulus surface pressure (MAASP) is the greatest pressure that an 
annulus is permitted to contain, as measured at the wellhead, without compromising the 
integrity of any barrier element or exposed formation. MAASP shall be determined for each 
annulus of the well, and the calculations documented (4).  
There are three types of annular pressure that can occur during the well’s life cycle (8): 
• Imposed annulus pressure: pressure applied to an annulus by operator as part of 
the well operating requirements; typically this can be gas lift in the A - annulus. 
• Thermally induced annulus pressure: pressure created by thermal changes 
occurring within the well. 
• Sustained annulus pressure (SCP): pressure in any well annulus that is 
measurable at the wellhead and rebuilds when bled down, not caused solely by 
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temperature fluctuations or imposed by the operator.  SCP can arise for a variety of 
causes, including degradation or failure of well barriers.   
A bleed - down / build - up test performed on the annulus is one method to confirm the 
nature of the pressure source, and the well operator should establish a procedure for 
conducting these tests (11). When the temperature and flow rates are stable, the annuli 
pressures should also be stable. Abnormal pressure changes (SCP) may indicate a failure in 
the barrier envelope, such as a leakage. 
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2.4 12BLoss of Well integrity  
 
2.4.1 31BMajor accidents on the NCS 
 
The Bravo oil and natural gas blowout in 1977, West Vanguard shallow gas blowout in 
1985 and the Snorre A gas blowout in 2004 seen in figure 7 are some examples on major 
accidents on the NCS. These are the main drivers for the current focus on well integrity in 
the industry.  
 
 
                                                               Figure 7: Major accidents on the NCS. 
 
2.4.1.1 48B ravo blowout in 1977 
 
On April 22, 1977, well B-14 on the Bravo production platform in the Ekofisk field 
experienced an oil and natural gas blowout during workover. It resulted in the worst oil 
spill in Norwegian history, and seven days passed before the well was killed. An amount of 
202 380 barrels of oil escaped in an estimated rate of 1170 barrels per hour. Fortunately, 
none of the 112 crew members were injured (15). 
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2.4.1.2 49BWest Vanguard blowout in 1985 
 
A shallow gas blowout occurred on 6 October 1985 while the rig was drilling an 
exploration well on the Halten Bank in the Norwegian Sea. The gas flowed up the topside 
and ignited causing an explosion which killed one person and caused great material 
damage. Afterwards the industry implemented a number of measures to reduce the risk of 
shallow gas blowouts. One of the main measures was to drill a pilot borehole in order to 
maintain better control when encountering shallow gas pockets (16).  
 
2.4.1.3 50BSnorre A blowout in 2004 
 
On 28 November, 2004, an uncontrolled situation occurred during preparation for drilling a 
sidetrack in well P-31A on the Snorre A facility. The situation developed into an 
uncontrolled gas blowout on the seabed, resulting in gas under the facility. The PSA 
characterized this incident as one of the most serious to occur on the NCS. This is due to 
the potential of the incident, as well as comprehensive failure of the barriers in planning, 
implementation and follow - up of the work on well P-31A. Only chance prevented a major 
accident with the danger of loss of many lives, damage to the environment and loss of 
material assets. Under slightly different circumstances the incident could have resulted in 
ignition of the gas as well as buoyancy and stability problems. Surveys on the seabed after 
the incident revealed several large craters near the well template and near the fastening 
anchors for the Snorre A platform { (17), (2)}. 
 
2.4.2 32BWhat are the major accident risks during the operational phase 
of the well?  
 
The common factors from the accidents mentioned above were integrity issues resulting in 
barrier failure and hence a blowout. However, none of them occurred during the operational 
(production) phase of the well, but when the D&W organization had the operating 
responsibility. Some may ask why there needs to be such a focus on blowout risk during 
production, as blowouts have never occurred during the operational phase of the wells on 
the NCS. 
23 
 
Although the probability of an uncontrolled blowout during production is very low, the 
potential consequences of such an event would be catastrophic. Blowouts in the operational 
phase outside Norway illustrate that it is not an unimaginable event. The wells on Bravo 
and Snorre A had both been in production before they were handed back to D&W for a 
well operation, and the barrier status could have been changed before the handover. This 
would have given a better description of the risks before any work was started in the well, 
and the situation potentially avoided. The handover between the organizations is therefore a 
critical part. In case the barrier status has changed, the handover documentation must be 
updated to reflect the status and associated risk making the new owner aware of the 
changes. 
Because of the possibility of extended profitable production beyond the assumed design life 
of wells (due to high oil prices, increased recovery and governmental incentives) well 
integrity in the operational phase is of major importance. Life extension may result in more 
frequent failures involving leakages to the surroundings which can have huge 
consequences. 
There can be two types of leakages in the well during production, explained by dividing 
them into “internal” and “external”. Leakages through SCSSV or x- mas tree valves are 
categorized as “internal” and there is a bleed off possibility via flowline to a closed 
production system. There are in addition several valves (not considered to be a part of the 
WBEs) after the PWV which can be used to shut in the well if there is a leak into the 
flowline system. “External” leakages are leakages outwards in the well through tubing, 
casing, cement, formation or x- mas tree / wellhead, and are considered the worst. This is 
due to potential of getting uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons to seabed or in worst case 
scenario - all the way up to the platform. Compared to the “internal”, “external” leakages 
will be much more challenging to repair involving time consuming and costly interventions 
/ workovers.  Possible leak paths to the surroundings are shown in figure 8 where four 
scenarios are illustrated: 
1. Internal leakage due to failure of SCSSV and x-mas tree valves. Bleed off 
possibilities via flowline to closed systems. 
2. External leakage into overlying formation – a buffer zone. The leakage is trapped in 
the formation, and will not cause any further fracturing. 
3. External leakage into the overlying formation. The formation cannot take the 
increased pressure, and the leak will cause fracturing all the way up to seabed.  
24 
 
4. External leakage through x-mas tree / wellhead resulting in hydrocarbons reaching 
surface (platform wells) or seabed (subsea wells). 
The two last scenarios are considered worst as you get a release of hydrocarbons to sea / 
installation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
 
                                                                 Figure 8: Possible leak paths. 
 
Potential consequences of uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons to sea or installation are:  
• Blowout / well release.  
• Fire / explosion. 
• Washout of foundation. 
• Stability and buoyancy problems.  
A blowout is an incident where formation fluid flows uncontrollably out of the well due to 
the failure of well barriers or the activation of the same has failed. A well release is an 
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incident where oil or gas flows from the well from some point where flow was not 
intended, and stopped by use of the barrier system that was available in the well at the time 
the incident started. It is not a continuous flow like a blowout, but the hydrocarbons are 
released in one portion. During a blowout / well release the formation at seabed can be 
washed out potentially causing stability problems for the platform or damage on other 
structures at seabed. There will also be a major risk of a fire / explosion if a certain amount 
or concentration of gas reaches the installation. A major gas release may also cause stability 
and buoyancy problems for floating production units. 
 
2.4.3 33BWell integrity issues 
 
Well integrity can easily be defined as a condition of a well in operation that has full 
functionality and two qualified well barrier envelopes. Any deviation from this state is a 
minor or major integrity issue. Common issues are often related to leaks in tubular or 
valves, but can also be related to reservoir issues as loss of zonal control (18). Typical 
failure modes are shown in figure 9. If a well barrier has failed the only action that that can 
take place in a well is to restore the failed barrier. This is impaired in the Activities 
Regulations § 85. In some cases the well barrier can be redefined and production continued. 
If redefinition of the barrier envelope is not possible, the well has to be shut in to avoid 
further escalation and damage. Shutting in a well means to close one or several valves in 
the well stopping further production / injection. In some special cases shutting in a well 
because of an integrity issue can do more harm than continued production / injection.  This 
is due to the high pressure that can build up in the well from the reservoir. 
Loss of well integrity is either caused by mechanical, hydraulic or electrical failure related 
to the well components, or by wrongful application of a device. The corrective actions are 
often costly and risky, and losses due to production / injection - stop may be very high (18). 
Any factor that leads to a functional failure is a loss of well integrity. The challenge is to 
define all possible scenarios and this is where the crucial part of risk assessment comes into 
play. For successful delivery of well integrity there needs to be an understanding of the 
risks that can cause undesirable events. Performing a risk assessment on a well will help 
determine and rank the potential risks, and increase the understanding of the potential 
negative consequences that may result from specific problems a well may have or develop. 
The operators can use this information to reduce risk in the operational phase and minimize 
potential well integrity issues. This will be the topic in the next chapters.  
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  Figure 9: Typical modes of well failure (4). 
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2.5 13BRisk fundamentals 
 
The most common way to see risk is as the opposite of safety, and it can be defined as the 
combination of consequences of an event and the associated likelihood of occurrence of the 
event. Risk management includes all measures and activities carried out to manage risk, 
and it deals with balancing the conflicts inherent in exploring opportunities on the one 
hand, and avoiding losses, accidents and disasters on the other (19). In the safety field 
however, it is generally recognized that consequences are only negative and therefore the 
management of risk is focused on prevention and mitigation of harm. ISO 31000 defines 
risk as “effect of uncertainty on objectives”. This uncertainty is associated with the event 
(which may or may not happen) and the outcomes of the event (20). Since risk relates to 
future happenings there will always be a lack of knowledge ruling. In well integrity, the 
most serious event potentially caused by well component failures is obviously a leak of 
hydrocarbons to surface, and the consequences can be huge. 
Risk can be related to losses compromising: 
• Safety. 
• Environmental damage. 
• Asset damage. 
• Negative public image.  
Well barriers are used to prevent leakages to surface and hence reduce the risk of blowouts 
and well releases. The main objectives of a well barrier are to: 
• Prevent any major hydrocarbon leakage from the well to the external environment 
during normal production / injection. 
• Shut in the well on direct command during an emergency shutdown situation and 
thereby prevent hydrocarbons from flowing from the well. 
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2.5.1 34BRisk assessment 
 
NORSOK D-010 states that if a well barrier is degraded, a risk assessment should be 
performed and the following considered (1): 
• Cause of degradation. 
• Potential of escalation.  
• Reliability and failure modes of primary WBEs. 
• Availability and reliability of secondary WBEs. 
• Outline plan to restore or replace degraded well barriers. 
 
 
Figure 10: The risk assessment process (21). 
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Risk assessment provides a basis for decisions about the most appropriate approach to be 
used when treating risks and prioritize them.  It is the overall process of risk analysis and 
risk evaluation, and is illustrated in figure 10 (21). 
Risk analysis is about developing an understanding of the risks, and shall identify potential 
hazards and hazardous events. A hazard is a potential source of harm, like for example a 
well component failure. A hazardous event occurs when the hazard’s potential to cause 
harm is realized, for example a leak of hydrocarbons to surface (22). The main objective of 
risk analysis is to identify the hazardous events, and find the causes (hazards) and potential 
consequences of these events. Based on the outcome from the analysis a risk evaluation 
about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment implementation is made. 
This is the other crucial part of the risk assessment process. NS 5814 defines risk evaluation 
as: “A comparison of the results of a risk analysis with the acceptance criteria for risk and 
other decision criteria”. Further NS 5814 defines acceptance criteria as: “Criteria based on 
regulations, standards, experience and knowledge used as a basis for decisions about 
acceptable risk” (23). In the operational phase of a well the risk analysis should illustrate 
the changes in risk resulting from an integrity issue, and the evaluation should conclude 
whether this change is acceptable or not. 
 
 
        Figure 11: Risk assessment is an input to the decision making process of the organization (24). 
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As seen from figure 11 the output from the risk assessment is an input to the decision -
making process of the organization, and helps the responsible parties on how to treat the 
risks. Risk treatment involves selecting and agreeing on relevant options for changing the 
probability of the event, the consequences of the event, or both, and implementing these 
options. Thus, based on the risk picture, different measures are introduced to change the 
risk (24).     
Different types of techniques are used to assess the magnitude of a well integrity issue, but 
in general a standard risk assessment typically involves (4): 
• Identification of hazards.  
• Identification of hazardous events. 
• Cause analysis of the event. 
• Determination of potential consequences. 
• Determination of the probability of the event occurring. 
• Determination of the magnitude of the risk based on the combined effect of 
consequences and probability of occurrence.   
The assessment of any well failure related event is normally done by constructing a risk 
assessment matrix. Here the magnitude of the risk can be categorized or ranked based on 
the combined effects of consequences and likelihood of occurrence.  
Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) can also be used to determine well 
integrity risk. It is particularly useful in establishing the types of component failures that 
can occur, the effect on the well barrier envelope(s) and the likelihood of such failures 
occurring. Detailed risk assessment methods and techniques can be found in ISO 17776, 
ISO 31000 and ISO 31010. The two mentioned above plus a more comprehensive analysis 
for system reliability will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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2.5.2 35BRisk assessment techniques for well integrity 
 
For analyzing well integrity issues, a qualitative risk assessment approach is best suited, as 
it makes the process significantly easier. Operating companies typically do not record or 
maintain accurate records of the number of and types of actual well component failures that 
have occurred over time. Also the sharing of such data within the industry is generally 
lacking, thus makes it hard to produce a numerical value (quantitative value) of risk level. 
However, using a qualitative approach relies heavily on the experience and knowledge of 
the participants, and is therefore subjective in nature. To deliver a thorough and consistent 
qualitative assessment, it is important to have participation from experienced and 
knowledgeable team members from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. In this 
section some examples on qualitative risk assessment techniques for well integrity will be 
described. 
 
2.5.2.1 51BRisk matrix 
 
A risk matrix is made by combining the probability and consequence of an event to produce 
a level of risk in the means of risk rating. In the well integrity aspect a matrix can be used 
to decide whether the integrity issue poses an acceptable level of risk or not. It is relatively 
easy to use, and provides a rapid ranking of risks into different significance levels. The 
format of the matrix and the definitions applied to it depend on the context it is used in, and 
it is suited to evaluate risks related to single activities, tasks or scenarios. It is commonly 
used as a screening tool when many risks have been identified, to define which need further 
and more detailed analysis, treatment first or a higher level of management. It also helps 
communicate a common understanding for qualitative level of risks across the organization 
(24). 
The consequence scale should cover the range of different types of consequences to be 
considered, for example relating safety, financial loss, environment, reputation or other 
parameters depending on the context. Definitions of probability need to be selected to be as 
unambiguous as possible, and the scale should be constructed in the way that the lowest 
probability must be acceptable for the highest defined consequence (24). 
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Figure 12 shows an example of a matrix with consequence (impact) on one axis and 
probability (likelihood) on the other. The risk levels assigned to the cells will depend on the 
definitions for the probability / consequence scales. The matrix is usually separated into 
three regions as follows (21): 
• High risk (red): Not acceptable. Risk reduction, high management attention or more 
detailed assessment is necessary.  
• Medium risk (yellow): Risk reduction based on the ALARP principle.  
• Low risk (green): Broadly acceptable risk. 
ALARP expresses that the risk shall be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably 
practicable. The term reasonably practicable implies that the risk reducing measures shall 
be implemented until the cost (in a wide sense, including time, capital cost or other 
resources / assets) of further risk reduction is grossly disproportional to the potential risk 
reducing effect achieved by implementing any additional measures { (21), (19)}. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 12: Standard risk matrix (21). 
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2.5.2.2 52BFailure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
 
The main method for failure identification is the failure modes, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA). This is a simple method to reveal possible failures and to predict the 
effects on a system as a whole. Figure 13 shows a system made up of several components / 
elements. The analysis is carried out by asking questions for each component (19): 
• What is the function? 
• Failure modes? 
• Effect on the system? 
 
 
       Figure 13: System with several elements.  
 
In a well integrity context, failure modes of the well barrier elements and how these affect 
the barrier envelopes is described in a FMECA. 
The primary output from the analysis is a list of failure modes, the failure mechanisms 
(cause) and effect on the system as a whole. It should also include a rating of importance 
based on the likelihood that the system will fail, and the level of risk resulting from the 
failure mode. Failure modes for a valve as an example may be fail to close, fail to open or 
leakage in closed position. Failure mechanisms describe the causes and may be physical 
(e.g. corrosion, erosion, fatigue) or human errors. The effect on the barrier envelope may be 
classified as safe or dangerous (18). A FMECA worksheet is shown in table 2. 
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A weakness of the FMECA is that it may have too much technical focus, whereas human 
failures are often overlooked. It is also unsuitable for analyzing systems with much 
redundancy, as it only looks in to single failure modes and not combination of component 
failure. FMECA gives a systematic overview of failures in the system, and is a good basis 
for more comprehensive assessment such as a fault tree analysis. It detects the weaknesses 
of the system as a result of individual component failure { (24), (19)}. 
 
2.5.2.3 53BFault tree analysis (FTA) 
 
A fault tree analysis (FTA) is as mentioned a more comprehensive assessment used to 
analyze system reliability, and the main purpose is to explain why a system failure can 
occur. In a well integrity context, the system failure may be “Leakage to environment”, and 
is called the TOP event of the fault tree. The causes of the TOP event are identified and 
combined by logic gates. Fault tree construction is a deductive approach, as it iteratively 
asks what type of events (component failures) that may result in the system failure. A fault 
tree compromises (18): 
 
• The TOP event: This is a precise description of the system failure, and should 
describe what the system failure is (for example leakage to surface), where the 
failure occurs or is observed (for example the wellhead) and when the failure may 
occur (for example in the operational situation). The TOP event may be described as 
“Leakage to environment through the wellhead during normal production”. 
• OR and AND gates: A fault tree applies two main types of logical gates, OR and 
AND gates. When using an OR gate the output event occurs when one or more of 
Table 2: FMECA worksheet (18). 
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the basic (input) events occur. When using an AND gate the output event occurs 
when all the basic (input) events occur at the same time.  
• Basic events: Represent the lowest level of events (component failures, external 
events) that may initiate the development of a system failure. The events in a fault 
tree are described in rectangles, and for basic events, a circle is drawn beneath the 
rectangle. A triangle is used when the event needs further development on a 
different page / tree. 
The different elements can be seen in figure 14. 
 
 
                                                                     Figure 14: Elements in a FTA. 
 
An example of how to construct a fault tree is described in the compendium “An 
introduction to well integrity” (18), and will now be presented: 
The FTA always starts with the TOP event, and for well integrity this will as mentioned 
usually be “Leakage to surroundings”. The fault tree is then developed step by step from 
the TOP event by repeatedly asking “How can this event happen?” This is answered by 
identifying all possible places the leakage can come out, and then do a further analysis of 
each and every flow path.  
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As seen from figure 15, there are ten different arrows (representing flow paths) that can 
cause a leakage to surroundings. If at least one of the flow paths is leaking, the TOP event 
will happen. This means that there is an OR relationship. The triangles beneath the 
rectangles indicate that the fault tree is not completed and that a further evaluation of the 
event is needed on a separate page. 
 
                                                                   
Figure 16 shows the start of a separate fault tree constructed for flow path 6 as an example. 
To have a leakage through this flow path the wellhead must be leaking and there must be 
flow to the wellhead. The event “Flow into wellhead” needs further development and is 
therefore marked with a triangle. The basic event “Leakage from wellhead” is marked with 
a circle that has a code for abbreviation, hence WHL for “Wellhead leak”. The event “Flow 
into wellhead” is developed further in figure 17. Fault trees for the other nine flow paths 
can be constructed in the same way, and combining them would give the final result 
showing all the failure modes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
                                                Figure 16: Fault tree for leakage flow path 6 (18). 
Figure 15: Fault tree representing leakage flow paths (18). 
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                                      Figure 17: Fault tree showing the event “Flow into wellhead” (18). 
 
A complete fault tree shows all failure combinations or causes that lead to a specified 
failure or dangerous situation. These combinations are referred to as “cut sets”, and is a set 
of basic events whose (simultaneous) occurrence ensure that the TOP event occurs. If not 
all the basic events of the minimal cut set occur, the top event fails to happen (19). 
 The minimal cut sets related to the event “Leakage flow path 6” in figure 17 are: 
• {WHL,PPL}: wellhead is leaking AND production packer is leaking 
• {WHL, TLBD}: wellhead is leaking AND the tubing below DHSV is leaking  
• {WHL, DHSV, TLAD}: wellhead is leaking AND the DHSV (SCSSV) is leaking 
AND the tubing above the DHSV is leaking.  
The fault tree construction is based on a very simple and logical procedure, and is therefore 
suitable for brainstorming sessions involving people that have not been trained in fault tree 
construction. Pictorial representation leads to an easy understanding of the system behavior 
and the components included, but as the trees are often large the processing of them may 
require computer systems. As they may become big and consist of many pages, it can be 
easy to lose oversight, and they are time consuming to create. However, the logical analysis 
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of the trees and the identification of cut sets, are useful in identifying failure pathways in 
complex systems. Unlike the FMECA, human errors can also be included in the FTA. 
 
2.5.2.4 54BStatoil’s compliance and leadership model 
 
Statoil’s compliance and leadership model seen in figure 18 is an easy and understandable 
method of performing a risk assessment before a work task. The advantage of the model is 
its comprehensibility to most people who may not be that familiar to the risk assessment 
discipline and complex analysis methods. It describes how to plan, execute, evaluate and 
learn from any task, and compromises five steps denoted the “A- standard” (25).  
 
 
The three first steps are related to planning. Identification of risk (step 1) and risk handling 
(step 2 and 3) are strongly emphasized in the A-standard. A correct and shared 
understanding of the task is a precondition for identifying and handling risk. Beneath is a 
general description of each step in the model (25): 
Step 1: Understand the task and risk: Ensure a shared understanding of the delivery, the 
sub - tasks that must be performed, the purpose of the task, necessary relationships 
(context) and risk associated with executing the task. Identify knowledge and experience 
that may contribute to understanding of the task, its risks and effective execution. 
Figure 18: Statoil’s compliance and leadership model (25). 
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Step 2: Identify and understand requirements: Identify and develop a shared understanding 
of relevant requirements for the task. Most tasks are subject to specific requirements in the 
ARIS management system. 
Step 3: Manage risk: Evaluate whether the identified requirements are adequate for 
managing the risks involved. Determine how identified risks not addressed by the 
management system shall be managed. 
Steps 1-3 result in a plan for how to execute the task. 
Step 4: Execute task: Assess and manage changes in risk and assumptions continually while 
executing the task. 
Step 5 Evaluate result. Extract learning: Assess progress, gaps, experience and learning. 
Propose improvements and share best practice. 
The compliance and leadership model can be used for every work task in Statoil. In a well 
integrity context the work task will be related to evaluating whether a well with integrity 
issue is within the requirements for acceptable risk. 
After many incidents in relation to well integrity, more focus has been directed towards risk 
assessment of wells in operation. As mentioned there are several methods and techniques, 
and the degree of complexity and time effort varies. In response to the industry and 
regulatory interest a simple system for risk categorizing a well based on its integrity status 
was developed by WIF in the NOG Recommended Guidelines 117. This system describes 
the barrier status of the wells, and hence says something about the probability of a leak to 
the surroundings. The operators on the NCS have used this as a basis for developing their 
own well categorization systems in order to rank their wells with regards to risk. However, 
they have not yet managed to find a system which captures the total risk picture in a good 
enough way. In the next chapters different well categorization systems developed will be 
described, starting with the basis in the NOG Guidelines 117.  
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2.6 14BWell integrity categorization of wells in operation with 
regards to risk 
 
The PSA’s pilot well integrity survey in 2006 revealed that the industry needs to increase 
focus on barrier philosophy. Control of barrier status is an important HSE factor to avoid 
major incidents caused by leaks and well control situations. The 2006 survey included the 
operators on the NCS and PSA selected new and old facilities, platform and subsea wells, 
injection and production wells from north to south of the NCS. Seven selected operating 
companies (included Statoil ASA) received an audit notification from PSA and were 
requested to provide status of well integrity issues for 12 preselected offshore facilities and 
406 wells. The scope of the audit was to analyze how comprehensive the well integrity 
problems on the NCS were, and identify the main issues and challenges { (26), (3)}. 
 
 
Based on input from 21 percent of the active wells on the NCS, the survey formed a basis 
for an evaluation of well integrity status on the NCS. Figure 19 shows the number of wells 
with well integrity issues, and illustrates the category of barrier element failure. Most of the 
integrity problems were within barrier elements such as tubing, annulus safety valves 
(ASV), casing, cement and wellhead. Table 3 shows that 7 percent of the wells were shut - 
in because of well integrity problems, and that 9 percent of the wells were working under 
exemptions { (3), (26)}. 
Figure 19: Number of wells with well integrity issues and category of barrier element failure (26). 
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 The survey concluded that the need for having a 100 percent control of barrier status at all 
times is of utmost importance to eliminate potential risks. A well - known status code 
enables the companies to rank their wells with regards to well integrity, and take the right 
actions in a proactive manner before any major losses.  
 
2.6.1 36BNorwegian Oil and Gas (NOG) Recommended Guidelines 117 for 
Well integrity 
 
In response to the findings from the 2006 survey WIF developed a system for classifying a 
well based on its integrity status. The system is described in NOG Recommended 
Guidelines 117, chapter 4 - Well integrity well categorization (8). The intention with this 
well categorization was to help the operators finding a system to rank and prioritize their 
wells. PSA could also use the results to summarize the well integrity across the entire NCS.  
It was decided that WIF should work on a Norwegian oil industry recommendation that 
would focus on wells in the production phase. Furthermore, it should be kept simple with 
only 3 - 4 categories. With the feedback from DMF and PSA, WIF was able to propose a 4 
category, traffic light system based on the double barrier principle. The Guidelines 117 
presents these 4 resultant categories, summarizes the basis of each and one and provides 
examples in effort to promote a common understanding of each category for the end user. 
The system is intended for categorization of all well types that are in operation, shut in, 
suspended or temporarily abandoned.  
 
                            Table 3: Well integrity impact (A, B, C) for production and injection wells (26). 
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The well integrity categorization is based on the double barrier philosophy that is outlined 
in the regulations and NORSOK D-010: 
“There shall be two well barriers available during all well activities and operations, 
including suspended or abandoned wells, where a pressure differential exists that may 
cause uncontrolled outflow from the borehole / well to the external environment”.  
 
2.6.1.1 55BOverview of the category principles 
 
The four category system utilizes a green / yellow / orange / red traffic light, color coded 
system to rank the wells in regards to well integrity, and the system principle is based on 
number of well barriers. Green and yellow are acceptable according to standards and in 
compliance with the two barrier principle. Orange and red are wells with integrity problems 
which usually will be further diagnosed, evaluated and risk assessed for appropriate follow 
up action. Red is used for wells which in addition to failure of one barrier have a 
considerable degradation or failure of the second barrier. An overview of the category 
principles can be seen in table 4. In the following sections the categories will be described 
in more detail as they are in the Guidelines 117. 
 
                                                   Table 4: Category principles from Guidelines 117 (8). 
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2.6.1.2 56BGreen category 
 
The principle for the green category is: 
“Healthy well - no or minor integrity issue” 
Wells categorized as green should be regarded to have an associated risk which is identical 
or comparable to the risk associated with an identical new well with a design in compliance 
with all regulations. It does not necessarily mean that the well has a history without failures 
or leaks, or that the WBEs fulfil all acceptance criteria described in the latest revision of 
NORSOK D-010, but the well is in full compliance with the double barrier requirement. 
Typically a well categorized as green will not require any immediate repairs or mitigating 
measures. For a well to fall in the green category the condition of typical well barrier 
elements would usually fulfil the criteria in table 5:  
 
 
                                                       
2.6.1.3 57BYellow category  
 
The principle for the yellow category is:  
“One barrier degraded, the other is intact”  
 
Wells categorized as yellow should be regarded to have an incremental associated risk 
which is not negligible compared to the risk associated with an identical new well with 
design in compliance with all regulations. Although a well categorized as yellow has an 
increased risk, its condition is within regulations. It should also be noted that even if the 
well has a history without any leaks or failures and the WBEs fulfil all acceptance criteria 
Table 5: Criteria for green category (8). 
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described in NORSOK D-010 the well may fall within the yellow category if conditions 
exist which constitutes a threat to both barriers and risk of dual failures is present.  
For a well to fall in the yellow category the condition of typical well barrier elements would 
usually fulfil the criteria in table 6:  
 
                                                           Table 6: Criteria for yellow category (8). 
  
A well with sustained casing pressure can fall within the yellow category even though there 
are hydrocarbons present in the annuli (not intentionally placed there) if it fulfils the 
following criteria: There are no leaks through both established primary and secondary 
barriers, annuli pressures are maintained below the defined pressure limits in a controlled 
manner and the leak rate into the annuli is within acceptance criteria. Wells not cemented 
according to the latest version of NORSOK D-010 can fall within the yellow category if: 
Sufficient strength or permeability does not exist in the formation which would be exposed 
to well pressure should a barrier failure occur under the production packer as long as the 
cement is still qualified as WBE. 
 
2.6.1.4 58BOrange category 
 
The principle for the orange category is:  
“One barrier failure and the other is intact, or a single failure may lead to leak to surface”  
Wells categorized as orange should be regarded to have an associated risk which is higher 
than the risk associated with an identical new well with design in compliance with all 
regulations. Typically a well categorized as orange will be outside the regulations. Repairs 
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and / or mitigations will be required before the well can be put into normal operation, but 
the well will still have an intact barrier and there will usually not be an immediate and 
urgent need for action. 
For a well to fall in the orange category the condition of typical well barrier elements would 
usually fulfil the criteria in table 7:  
 
                                                           Table 7: Criteria for orange category (8). 
 
                                                      
A well with sustained casing pressure will fall within the orange category if the leak rate 
into the annuli is outside acceptance criteria. Wells not cemented according to the latest 
version of NORSOK D-010 can fall within the orange category if: Sufficient strength or 
impermeability does not exist in the formation which would be exposed to well pressure 
should a barrier failure occur below production packer, and there is a potential for 
breaching to surface, as long as the cement is still qualified as WBE. 
 
2.6.1.5 59BRed category  
 
The principle for the red category is:  
“One barrier failure and the other degraded / not verified, or leak to surface”  
Wells categorized as red should be regarded to have an associated risk which is 
considerably higher than the risk associated with an identical new well with design in 
compliance with all regulations.  
Typically a well categorized as red will be outside the regulations. Repairs and / or 
mitigations will be required before the well can be put into normal operation and there will 
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usually be an immediate and urgent need for action. A well should fall within the red 
category if at least one WBE in a barrier envelope has failed and at least one WBE in the 
other barrier envelope has also failed or is regarded as degraded or not verified (for 
example exposed to pressure outside verified design limit or evidence of corrosion).  
For a well to fall within the red category the condition of at least one typical WBE in a 
barrier envelope will usually be as mentioned in table 7 (Orange), and at the same time at 
least one typical WBE in the other barrier envelope will usually be as mentioned in table 6 
(Yellow) or table 7 (Orange). This could for example be leak outside acceptance criteria in 
completion string and additional leak within acceptance criteria in casing string. Another 
example is a leak outside acceptance criteria in SCSSV and additional leak outside 
acceptance criteria in x - mas tree ESD valve.  
A well with sustained casing pressure will fall within the red category if annuli pressures 
are above the defined pressure limits and the leak rate into the annuli is outside acceptance 
criteria. Wells not cemented according to the latest version of NORSOK D-010 can fall 
within the red category if: Sufficient strength or impermeability does not exist in the 
formation which would be exposed to well pressure should a barrier failure occur below 
production packer, there is a potential for breaching to surface and the cement is not 
qualified as WBE. 
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2.6.2 37BStatoil’s first development of risk status codes from NOG 
Guidelines 117 
 
Based on the categorization principles and examples generated in WIF, Statoil developed 
their own set of internal risk status codes to classify wells in operation and temporary 
abandoned wells. These describe whether the wells are within internal and regulatory 
requirements and the risk associated with any deviations. They should be used for 
prioritization of well interventions and workovers in order to re - establish barriers (27). 
The system consists of five different risk status color codes as seen in table 8. The only way 
this system differs from Guidelines 117, is the introduction of a new color; the light green. 
 
Table 8: Statoil’s first development of risk status codes from Guidelines 117 (27). 
 
                                
To determine risk status in this system each well had to be individually assessed, and the 
basic principles in table 8 should be used.  It was decided that each field should have an 
overview of the risk status for all their wells at all times. This was done by having a generic 
KPI spreadsheet compromising a lot of information like well name and type, life cycle 
status, operational code, integrity code and the resulting risk status code. Table 9 shows a 
part of the KPI sheet from the Statfjord A field as an example.  
In this KPI sheet the risk status will be automatically generated based on different integrity 
codes. These integrity codes are selected from a predefined pick list, and the pick list is 
based on examples of well component failures generated in WIF. The integrity codes with 
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their description and assigned risk status code are shown in table 10, and they are grouped 
into different failure areas. The main rule states that one should always pick the case with 
the highest risk status if there are several non - conformances. 
In 2013 a new software, Intetech Well Integrity Toolkit (iWIT), was developed for Statoil 
to present the well integrity status for wells in operation. This tool includes an overview of 
the risk status of the wells, and is based on the principles from the section above in addition 
to a new aspect – escalation risk factors. iWIT will be further described in the next section.   
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Table 9: Well integrity KPI’s from Statfjord A. 
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Table 10: Pick list with examples on well component failures generated in WIF (27). 
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2.6.3 38BiWIT 
 
iWIT presents the well integrity status for wells in operation as well as historical well 
integrity information. The tool supports the work processes for handover of well 
responsibility and well integrity monitoring (28). It will by 2014 be used for all Statoil’s 
installations on the NCS, and the process of implementing all the wells in this software is 
ongoing. In figure 20 the front page when entering iWIT is shown. There are many 
different status codes like operational, well barrier, annulus, valve, wellhead and lifecycle 
status of wells. In this thesis, the status of interest is regarding risk, the circle highlighted 
red in figure 20. The front page illustrates the percentage of wells within the different risk 
status codes.  
 
 
 
Figure 20: Front page when entering iWIT. The risk status code is highlighted in red. 
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iWIT is a sophisticated system developed from the KPI sheet, and the risk status codes are 
based on the same 5 category principle with color codes seen in table 8 from the previous 
section. In addition it introduces 5 sub codes presented in table 11. These provide a better 
basis for describing the final risk status as they something about the escalation potential 
when having a well integrity issue. When the well experiences abnormal changes and / or 
non - conformances, the following risks shall be evaluated (28): 
 
• Well blowout risk / dual barrier: Is the dual barrier principle in place?  
• Well kill / recoverability: If the leak escalates or a single failure occurs, will it be 
possible to kill / isolate the leak or restore barriers?  
• Mechanical / pressure loads: Will the annulus be able to withstand the increased 
pressure caused by a potential leak?  
• Well release risk: Is there a potential of external hydrocarbon leaks through both 
barriers? Will the leakage result in storage of unacceptable hydrocarbon and toxic 
volumes in the annulus?  
• Corrosion / erosion: Are there any ongoing corrosion / erosion in the well that can 
cause acceleration of degradation of well barriers?  
 
The risk status for the well will be set to the worst of the defined escalation factor sub 
codes. To be able to assess these in more detail, table 12 could be used as guidance. 
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Table 11: Escalation risk sub codes (28). 
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Table 12: Guidance for defining risk status code in iWIT (28). 
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3. 2BDISCUSSION 
3.1 15BEvaluation of existing risk status categorization systems 
 
In this chapter an evaluation of the risk categorization systems described on the previous 
pages will be carried out. 
Chapter 4 in the NOG Recommended Guidelines 117 is the fundament of the development 
of well integrity status codes, and describes a system for categorizing wells according to 
their integrity status. The system principle is based on the condition and number of barriers 
in a well, thus it has a direct association with the probability of a leak to the surroundings 
and hence the risk of a well integrity issue. However, as the Guidelines also points out, this 
risk is not absolute. The system should not replace risk assessments as it does not say 
anything about the potential escalation of the leak (the severity of the well integrity issue) 
or the consequences of an external leak to the surroundings. For instance, two wells with 
only one remaining barrier can pose different levels of risk if one is a high rate gas well on 
a manned platform whereas the second is a subsea water injector. The Guidelines suggests 
that the operator should consider a further in depth risk assessment process for wells that 
are ranked high.     
Statoil’s first development of a well integrity categorization system from the NOG 
Guidelines 117 was based on the same principles with 5 colors (introducing a new light 
green status) - but they were now named risk status codes. This name can be misleading as 
the system basically is the same as the one generated by WIF, and only says something 
about the physical status of the barriers in the well. It would have been better suited to call 
them barrier / integrity status codes.  
Statoil’s new software, iWIT, takes the classification system a step further, as it introduces 
five sub codes which decide the final risk status (seen in table 11). These sub codes say 
something about the escalation potential when the well experiences abnormal changes and 
hence describes the severity of the well integrity issue and a small part of the potential 
consequences. But the leak is not quantified and the consequence description is lacking. As 
the final risk status is based on the worst sub code, this system does not differ much from 
the previous. By studying the well blowout risk / dual barrier sub group, one can see that it 
is identical to the main principle codes. In this way the status of the barriers will directly 
decide the resulting risk status of the well if ranked high, and the utilization of the other sub 
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escalation factors is overrun. Escalation risks with regards to well kill, well release, 
corrosion, erosion and pressure loads are in this way camouflaged in the final status. Proper 
usage of the 5 category sub groups involves finding a better way to utilize each and one of 
them in the risk status code. 
Risk can be defined as the combination of consequences of an event and the associated 
likelihood of occurrence of the event. A status code for wells in operation should reflect the 
risk associated with a leak to the surroundings as the major hazardous event is obviously a 
blowout or well release. The already developed systems for well integrity categorization are 
based on the barrier status and escalation potential for the leakage (iWIT), thus say 
something about the likelihood of a leak to the environment / surface. But the consequences 
of such a leak are not fully represented and taken into consideration. This is the missing 
part, and should be included in the status code to get a more complete risk picture. 
Figure 21 shows a bow tie diagram illustrating the blowout / well release risk for a well. On 
the left side are the causes, the well integrity issues, leading to the main event placed in the 
middle. The barrier envelopes are there to prevent the event from happening, thus they are 
reducing the probability of a blowout or well release. Imagine the barriers are not in place, 
and the event actually occurs. What will be the consequences? To get a more complete 
picture of the risk associated with the different wells, both sides of the bow tie need to be 
investigated. By focusing on the left side only, an important part is left out from the overall 
risk. If an accident occurs, the potential consequences could be huge. The consequences 
depend on a lot of factors regarding installation type, type of well, leakage characteristics, 
reservoir performance etc.   
 
                                         
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
                              Figure 21: Bow tie diagram illustrating blowout / well release risk for a well. 
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As it is today, wells within the same risk status code can pose different levels of risk. This 
can be very misleading, as it may be difficult to rank the wells and find out which needs the 
highest prioritization. It leads to the question: how red / orange is a red / orange well? 
Wells in the operational phase which are ranked as orange or red on barrier status are 
against the dual barrier authority criterion (ref the Activities Regulations § 85). Scarce 
resources make it impossible to perform interventions and workovers to re - establish the 
barrier(s) on all these wells at the same time. A selection of which get the first hand 
treatment must be made. If the barrier cannot be redefined, the well has to be shut in until 
the barrier is re - established. Statoil has between 30 - 40 orange wells (a lot less red wells, 
between 1- 4) at any time and there is a need for further differentiation with regards to risk. 
In this way the most risky orange / red wells can be identified, handed over to the D&W 
organization for remediation and prioritized before the ones ranked less critical.      
The most critical red and orange wells can be identified by having a system where the 
escalation risks are implemented in a better way and the potential consequences are 
included. In the next chapter proposals of such systems will be presented. This thesis 
suggests three new models for risk categorization. As there are numerous factors 
controlling the consequences, constructing a model representing all of them is very 
challenging. Much time was spent on trial and error in the development of the different 
systems. The final model which is best suited to describe the risk is presented in the end of 
next chapter. 
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4. 3BPROPOSAL OF NEW SYSTEMS FOR DEFINING RISK STATUS 
CODES 
 
In the operational phase a well component failure may result in changes in blowout and 
well release risk. How to assess this increased risk is focused on in this thesis, and it should 
be reflected in the final status code. Well barrier elements form an envelope preventing 
uncontrolled flow to the surroundings. In this way the barrier envelopes minimize the 
likelihood of a blowout or well release, and the barrier status can therefore be directly 
linked to the probability part of the risk definition. In the end of this chapter a new 
procedure for defining risk status codes will be proposed as an improvement to the one 
used today. It builds on the already existing principles for defining barrier status (shown in 
table 8), but includes a new feature – the potential consequences if there (in worst case) 
should be a leak to the environment / surface. The consequences are a function of many 
factors, in this thesis presented as different consequence factors. The purpose of the new 
system is to get a better measure of the risks the wells with integrity issues pose, and help 
differentiate wells within the same red and orange risk status code. This is a challenge 
today, as wells within the same category may have very different levels of risk depending 
on the severity of the integrity issue and how big the potential consequences may be. There 
is need for a system that can help defining which red and orange wells are the most critical 
with highest priority in the first run. 
The wells ranked high in the new categorization system will need additional resources, first 
in form of a more detailed risk assessment. This assessment shall investigate if these wells 
actually pose a larger risk compared to the others, and if immediate repair is required. 
This thesis will present different suggestions on models for risk categorization including 
the consequence aspects. Due the number of factors controlling the impact of a leak to the 
surroundings, it was challenging constructing a model taking all of them in to 
consideration. As there are several different well configurations and systems, the creation 
of a model capturing every case is hard. Several attempts on constructing categorization 
systems were performed before finding the one most representative. The final model, which 
is best suited to describe the overall risk for most of the wells, is suggested in the end. Its 
ability to reflect different levels of seriousness is evaluated by testing it on 5 field cases. 
First a discussion of the most important factors determining the potential consequences will 
be carried out. 
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4.1 16BConsequence factors   
 
The consequences will relate to health, safety and environment (HSE factors). Due to the 
fact that most of the wells have not yet experienced a leak to the surroundings, the 
consequences will reflect potential scenarios resulting from a blowout / well release 
situation. There are a number of factors that will decide the severity of the potential 
consequences of a well integrity issue. Beneath is a listing of some of them: 
Type of x - mas tree 
• Dry (Platform wells). 
• Wet (Subsea wells). 
The position of the x - mas tree will have a huge impact on the consequences if there is a 
leakage through the wellhead or x - mas tree seal assemblies or valves. On a subsea well the 
leakage will go to seabed, but on a platform well there is a potential of getting 
hydrocarbons directly on the platform deck. This will be the worst imaginable scenario. On 
platform wells there is an annulus bleed off possibility through the annulus access valves 
when experiencing SCP. The same possibility does not exist for subsea wells where the tree 
is positioned on seabed and there is only access to the A annulus. 
Well type 
• Production well. 
• Injection well. 
It is hard stating which type of well is the most risky. But a water injector with no 
possibility of hydrocarbon reflux from the reservoir will pose a much lower risk than an oil 
or gas flowing producer with regards to blowout / well release. A gas injector adding 
energy to the reservoir will however be more exposed to a dangerous situation as a 
component failure may lead to a major gas leak. 
Artificial lift  
• Free flowing producer. 
• Producer with artificial lift.  
As the pressure decreases in the reservoir, artificial lift may be required for continued 
production. Energy is then added to the fluid column in the wellbore, and the most common 
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principles used are gas lift and pumps. In a gas lift well, gas is injected via A - annulus 
through a gas lift valve into the tubing reducing the density of the fluid. Introducing gas in 
the A- annulus, adds an extra element to the overall risk as a large volume of gas can create 
a very dangerous situation in a well release situation. Such wells need additional barriers, 
preventing the gas from leaking out of the annulus. However, it is difficult to determine if 
there actually is a higher risk associated with gas lift wells contra free flowing production 
wells as the latter will produce from a reservoir with higher pressure. Assuming that the 
extra barriers for gas lift are in place and the gas lift pumps will automatically shut down in 
an emergency situation, these wells shall in theory not be more risky than the free flowing 
producers, rather contrary. 
Installation type 
• Fixed platform concepts (used primarily with dry tree wells). 
• Floating production units (used in combination with subsea wells).  
• Tension leg platforms and deep draft floaters (used primarily in combination with 
dry tree platform wells but can also have subsea wells). 
• Satellite fields with tie - back to installation. 
Satellite fields a distance away from the installation will not have the potential of endanger 
any human lives. But a leakage to seabed may be devastating for the environment, 
especially if the leaking medium is oil.  Fixed installations in combination with platform 
wells will have higher risk related to injuries / loss of lives in a blowout / well release 
situation. This is due to the potential of getting hydrocarbons on deck or washouts at seabed 
which can cause stability problems for the installation. Hydrocarbons reaching the platform 
deck may lead to fire or explosion which can do extensive harm to personnel and assets. 
Floating units may experience buoyancy problems if a certain amount of gas leaks directly 
under the unit, or problems with mooring lines and anchors. This is critical for wells 
positioned directly under the installation.   
Installation activity 
• Manned. 
• Unmanned. 
Obviously an unmanned wellhead platform is less critical than a manned platform with 
integrated living quarters. A major accident at one of the big platforms with high 
installation activity can cause loss of many lives. 
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 Well position on seabed relative to the production unit 
• Directly under the installation. 
• A distance away from the installation. 
As discussed previously the well position may have a major impact on the consequences, 
especially for the floating facilities. Are the wells positioned directly under the floater, a 
gas leakage may cause buoyancy and stability problems, and in worst case scenario sink the 
unit. Wells positioned a distance away from the installation will have a lower associated 
risk, as a leakage will not have the potential of reaching the facility.   
Well concentration 
   
• Low concentration. 
• High concentration. 
The potential of a “domino effect” arises when many wells are situated close to each other 
in clusters as a blowout / well release from one well can in turn damage other wells or 
structures at seabed.   
Multiple well failures 
• Single well failure. 
• Multiple well failures. 
Multiple well failures in a field will increase the risk for the installation and its personnel. If 
many wells are outside the dual barrier criterion in a field, they require additional attention.  
Water depth 
• Deep (> 300m). 
• Intermediate (100 – 300m). 
• Shallow (< 100m).   
In shallow water depths there is an increased risk of gas moving from seabed through water 
and up to the installation. In deeper water it is more likely the gas never reaches surface. 
The oil concentration at surface will also be significant lower if the oil needs to overcome a 
large depth, as it will be more spread.  
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Formation strength 
 
• Sufficient.  
• Insufficient: potential of fracturing. 
The strength of the overlying formation around the wellbore exerted to a leakage will 
determine the possibility of formation fracturing. In worst case the fracture can propagate 
and the leakage reach seabed. The formation strength will usually depend on the depth at 
which the formation is exposed to the leakage. If the well has a low TD (total depth), there 
is an increased risk that the formation does not have sufficient strength if exposed to a high 
reservoir pressure. The minimum horizontal stress (fracture re – opening pressure) is often 
used as requirement for formation strength. This is conservative, as it is much lower than 
the actual pressure needed to create a fracture. 
Type of well leakage 
• “Internal”: leakage to closed system. 
• “External”: leakage outwards in the well with potential of reaching seabed / surface 
(through    tubing, casing, cement, formation or x - mas tree / wellhead). 
The two types of well leakages are discussed previously. An “internal” leakage through 
SCSSV and x - mas tree valves (in connection with the process facility) has bleed off 
possibilities through the flowline system. As the leakage goes to a closed system, it is 
controllable and will never lead to a blowout or well release. However, if the x - mas tree 
should be damaged due to an external hazard and in worst case scenario, totally removed, it 
is critical that the SCSSV is in place and working. This is the reason for its required 
position - minimum 50 meters below the wellhead. For surface wells the main source of 
external hazard will likely be dropped objects on the platform with a potential for hitting 
and causing damage on the tree. Other events may be fire or explosions that can do 
extensive harm. For subsea wells the main source of external hazard will likely be dropped 
objects from vessels with potential for hitting and causing damage to the tree. Due to the 
extremely low probability for a total removal of the x - mas tree, this scenario is 
disregarded in this thesis.  
An “external” leakage is more serious than the “internal”. Depending on where the leakage 
exit point is, there will be a possibility of getting a leak of hydrocarbons to the formation, 
seabed or in worst case; directly on the platform. The last scenario can happen if there is a 
leakage into an annulus that is in direct contact with the wellhead / x - mas tree seal 
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assemblies or valves (not in connection with the flowline system). If the seals / valves fail 
and the x - mas tree or wellhead is positioned on the platform, this can be a very dangerous 
situation. Getting hydrocarbons in a high rate directly on the platform would be 
catastrophic.   
If a leakage results in formation fracturing, a potential buffer sand zone will reduce the risk 
for the hydrocarbons propagating to seabed. Buffer sand will trap the leakage and due to the 
size of the zone, there will be no significant pressure build up and further fracturing. 
 ESD – system   
• Valves fail to close (open). 
• Leaking above the acceptance criteria. 
In an emergency situation it is critical that the ESD valves close in response to loss of 
signal or hydraulic pressure. A leakage through the valves is regarded less serious as they 
still maintain their function criteria. 
Leakage characteristics  
• Accumulation of hydrocarbons (not necessarily in contact with reservoir). 
• Continuous flow of hydrocarbons (in contact with reservoir). 
A continuous flow of hydrocarbons indicates that the leakage is in contact with the 
reservoir. An accumulation of hydrocarbons however is not necessarily in contact with a 
reservoir, and will be less critical with regards to a blowout. 
Potential leak rate through barrier envelope 
• Low rate: Slightly above the acceptable rate for SCSSV (API RP 14B).  
• Medium rate: More than 2x the acceptable rate for SCSSV (API RP 14B). 
• High rate / blowout (>> API RP 14B). 
The leak rate is an important factor deciding the resulting consequences of a well integrity 
issue. A high rate will obviously pose a larger risk than a rate slightly above the API RP 
14B criteria, which has manageable consequences if released to the surroundings. A high 
leak rate (blowout) can cause severe environmental pollution, increased risk of fire and 
explosion and may lead to a major accident which endangers the whole installation and its 
personnel. 
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Well leakage fluid 
• Water. 
• Gas. 
• Oil. 
Finding out what type of fluid is leaking is of huge importance. Is the fluid water, the risk 
will reduce significantly. A hydrocarbon leakage with potential of reaching the platform 
deck is the worst scenario as this may cause fire and explosion. A leak of hydrocarbons to 
seabed may have huge consequences for the environment, especially if a large volume of 
oil gets released. Gas leakages are more critical for the installation, due to the potential of 
the gas propagating through water and up to the facility where it can lead to fire and 
explosion. If a certain amount of gas gets trapped under a floating unit, this may also cause 
buoyancy and stability problems.  
Ability to access the well 
• Monitoring. 
• Perform maintenance.  
• Perform repairs. 
It is harder to access subsea wells contra platform wells, and this makes it more difficult to 
perform maintenance and repairs. Due to the lack of monitoring of the B and C annuli on 
wet trees, a leak propagating outside the A-annulus can be hard to track. This makes the 
severity of the well integrity issue more uncertain. If immediate repair is needed in a critical 
situation, the subsea wells will pose a challenge due to the potential problems with 
accessing the well. Hooking up an intervention unit to the subsea x - mas tree may in some 
situations be impossible due to extreme weather conditions. 
Reservoir / injection pressure (relative to hydrostatic) 
• ≤ Normal (≤ Hydrostatic).  
• Abnormal (> Hydrostatic). 
• Abnormal high (>> Hydrostatic – HPHT wells). 
The reservoir pressure will be of great importance to the consequences of an integrity issue. 
A depleted reservoir with no or low source of outflow will never cause a blowout  as it will 
be impossible for the hydrocarbons to overcome the potential energy and travel up the well. 
A high pressure reservoir however, will have the potential of delivering a huge amount of 
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hydrocarbons due to the amount of energy stored in the reservoir fluid. This makes the high 
pressure, high temperature (HPHT) wells more critical. As the reservoir pressure is 
dependent on depth, it will be beneficial relating it to the hydrostatic pressure, as the depth 
may differ from well to well.  
Flow potential from reservoir 
• None / some. 
• Medium. 
• High. 
Although a reservoir with high pressure most likely has a high flow rate, there is no 
guarantee that this is true for all cases. The permeability and type of reservoir fluid will 
have a say on the flow potential. The reservoir model (size and shape) will also contribute 
to how much energy potentially flowing to the surroundings. 
Energy source  
• Reservoir. 
• Injection. 
• Gas lift 
Where the source of energy originates from will have a great influence on possible 
undesirable scenarios. Is the source injection or gas lift, an automatically shut down system 
will contribute to reduce the risk contra a manual. An uncontrolled blowout from a 
reservoir will be the worst imaginable scenario, as it may be difficult killing the well.  
Escalation factors 
• Corrosion / erosion. 
• Well kill / recoverability. 
• Mechanical / pressure loads. 
• Well release. 
These factors are previously discussed in relation to iWIT, and will affect the 
consequences, especially the well kill / recoverability, pressure loads and well release. A 
high uncontrollable flow of hydrocarbons to the surroundings not possible to isolate or kill 
is as mentioned the worst possible scenario. If a leak challenges the mechanical design 
limits of the well, it can in turn damage other well elements and lead to failure of both 
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barrier envelopes. Ongoing corrosion or erosion causing degradation of well components is 
critical in the long term perspective, but do usually not require immediate action. The group 
well release reflects if the leakage can result in storage of unacceptable hydrocarbon and / 
or toxic volumes in the annulus. 
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4.2 17BNew models for risk status categorization 
 
There are numerous factors affecting the potential consequences which can result from a 
well integrity issue, and some of them are listed in the previous section. The task ahead will 
be linking these factors in a logical system producing different categories illustrating the 
level of seriousness with regards to the consequences. Due to the number of factors, finding 
a system capturing all of them will be challenging and probably impossible. A choice as to 
which are the most important in terms of the overall risk must be made. Including all of 
them would potentially result in a very complicated and tangled system hard to use in 
practice. The final risk model will be a combination of the consequence categories and the 
already existing barrier status codes (shown in table 8), representing both the probability 
and impact of a blowout / well release.   
In the next sections different models for risk categorization will be presented. As the main 
task is producing a new classification system for the consequences, this is the main part 
emphasized in the models.    
 
4.2.1 39BModel 1 – iWIT modification 
 
This model builds on already existing principles, but proposes a modification of the iWIT 
risk status system. The 5 color codes (red / orange / yellow / light green / green) for 
defining barrier status (as in the first Statoil KPI sheet) seen in table 8 are now called the 
principle codes and will be the first step in the process of defining the final risk status. A 
modification of the sub group system presented in iWIT is proposed as another dimension 
to describe the severity of the well integrity issue. This will be done as a second step, after 
the principle code is set, and performed by giving the well a score relating to the sub 
groups. The two step process is necessary for proper utilization of the escalation factor sub 
groups. Today’s usage of this system only reflects the barrier status for the red and orange 
wells, as the dual barrier / blowout sub group overruns the others which are hidden in the 
final risk status. When the principle code is set and the escalation risk is decided after going 
through the sub groups, the final risk status will be a result of the combination of both. The 
steps are described below and seen in table 13. The well blowout / dual barrier sub group is 
intentionally left out, as it is identical to the principle codes. 
68 
 
 1. Decide principle code either red, orange, yellow, light green or green. 
2. Go through each of the four sub groups relating to escalation risk.  
3. Give a score (from 1 to 5 where 5 is the most serious) on escalation risk for each of 
the sub groups and summarize all of them to a final score in the end. 
4. Final risk status will be: principle code + summarized score on escalation risk. 
 
A simple method for separating wells within the same principle code is now available by 
denoting if they have a low or high associated escalation risk based on the score. The most 
critical wells have barrier failure(s) in addition to a high score from the sub groups. 
The final risk status will qualitatively say something about the likelihood of an external 
leak and is based on the number / condition of the barriers and potential escalation risks. 
The escalation factors will to some extent  describe the severity of the well integrity issue, 
and reflect a part of the consequences by involving well kill / recoverability, erosion / 
corrosion, well release and pressure loads. It is a simple model building on existing 
principles and will therefore be easy to implement.  
Only taking into consideration the escalation factors, the model does not fully describe the 
consequences of a blowout / well release. It does not include important parameters such as 
type of well, installation, reservoir performance, leakage characteristics etc. Due to the lack 
of consequence description model 1 was quickly rejected. 
 
. 
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                                       Table 13: The process of defining risk status codes for model 1. 
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4.2.2 40BModel 2 - Flowchart 
 
A flowchart is a diagram combining the factors in a logical manner by linking them with 
arrows, and by following different paths (scenarios) the result will be specific consequence 
categories. The pictorial presentation and logical composition of the factors make the 
flowchart very easy and intuitive to use and understand. It links the factors in steps or boxes 
and shows the path to a specific consequence category illustrating different scenarios.   
Figure 22 shows an example of a flowchart for consequence categorization with four levels 
of seriousness illustrated with different color codes; red, orange, yellow and green.  The red 
category represents the most critical wells with high risk for the facility and its personnel if 
there should be a blowout / well release. These wells have typically an “external” leak, high 
leak rate and a reservoir with potential of delivering a huge amount of uncontrollable 
energy. The orange category represents wells with significant risk for personnel, 
environment and facility, but is one level lower than the red with regards to seriousness. 
Wells with “internal” leaks, low leak rates and a reservoir with no flow potential will 
typically fall in the lowest levels – the green and yellow categories. The potential 
consequences resulting from a well integrity issue will not be as serious for these cases. 
As there are numerous factors controlling the consequences, it is hard constructing a 
flowchart. The one presented in this thesis has selected seven of them (well type, leak type, 
x – mas tree, well position, leak rate, reservoir pressure and leak fluid) as the most 
important for the final categories. When constructing the flowchart it quickly grew to a 
huge and complex diagram when trying to include many factors and produce cases 
representing different scenarios. As each path required the same questions the chart also got 
characterized with a lot of repetition. This made the construction very difficult, and it was 
hard including additional important factors with regards to the consequences.  Based on 
these experiences the flowchart idea was rejected, and no further work was put in to the 
development of a better diagram than the one presented in figure 22. This is only an 
example of a very simple flowchart producing different categories based on a few factors. It 
will not represent the severity of the consequences for different scenarios, as many 
important factors are not included.…………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………
71 
 
 
Figure 22: Example of a flowchart for consequence categorization for model 2. 
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4.2.3 41BModel 3 – Sum of the weighted consequence factors  
 
This model will give a “consequence score” by summarizing the weighted contribute from 
the different factors based on their level of significance: 
 
        CS = ∑ wi * fi  , 
                  where CS is the consequence score and wi is the weight given to the specific  
                 consequence factor, fi.  
 
The experience from constructing the flowchart was how the diagram got very complex and 
characterized with a lot of repetition when including many factors. These problems can be 
avoided by using the sum of the weighted consequence factors, as this method can include 
many parameters without getting too complicated. However, the challenge will be 
assigning the correct weights to the factors / parameters representing their true level of 
significance. Assessing which of them contributes most to the risk is a subjective 
evaluation. 
Due to the fact that the wells will get their risk status based on the scenario of factors, some 
combinations may have larger impact on the consequences than others. This can be a 
potential problem with this method, and adjustments to the main function may be 
necessary.  
The factors selected for the consequence categorization are parted into three areas:  
• Energy: energy source, reservoir / injection pressure, leak medium and flow 
potential.  
• Surroundings: type of well / installation, installation activity and water depth. 
• Barrier: leakage path, potential leakage rate and challenges relating to well kill / 
recoverability, pressure loads, corrosion / erosion and storage of hydrocarbons / 
toxic volumes in annuli. 
Figure 23 represents 3 different well types, a free flowing producer (A), an injector (B) and 
a producer with gas lift (C). The three main areas (energy, barrier and surroundings) will 
relate differently dependent on type of well. Free flowing producers have the reservoir as 
main source of energy. In injection wells the energy goes the opposite way. It flows from 
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the installation, through the well (barrier system) and into the reservoir. Gas lift wells have 
two sources of energy, the reservoir and the supplied gas which increases the flow rate of 
the produced fluid.  
        
                          Figure 23: How energy, barrier and surroundings are related for different well types. 
 
Dependent on type of well, the consequences may differ. This makes it challenging 
constructing a model taking into account every scenario of integrity issues for different 
types of well systems and configurations. Therefore the model must be general capturing 
most of the wells, as it will be impossible including the most special cases.  
The area energy is the premise to a potential accident. The amount and source of 
uncontrollable energy, type of leaking medium and flow potential will decide the impact of 
a well integrity incident.  Is the reservoir depleted with low pressure and flow potential, a 
blowout will quickly die out. A high pressure reservoir however, has the ability to deliver a 
huge amount of hydrocarbons for a long period of time, creating extensive damage to the 
environment, installation and personnel.   
The area surroundings will affect how severe the consequences will be depending on type 
of well (platform / subsea), well position, installation activity and water depth. Subsea 
wells a distance away from the production unit (satellite fields), will never threaten the 
facility and its personnel. Is the well positioned below the facility, it will have an increased 
risk as a leak to seabed may propagate through water and up to surface. In deep waters, this 
risk reduces significantly. Platforms are most critical in regards to safety, as a leak through 
the wellhead / x – mas tree can lead to hydrocarbons directly on deck. Having an 
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environmental perspective this will differ, as a hydrocarbon leakage to seabed on a subsea 
well can be devastating causing severe pollution especially if the leaking medium is oil.  
The barrier area describes the condition of the dual barrier envelopes, as it includes leak 
path, potential leak rate and challenges relating to corrosion / erosion, pressure loads, well 
kill / recoverability and hydrocarbon storage in the well. The barriers are the technical 
solution preventing the underlying premise, the energy, to realize its potential for a major 
accident.  
Factors relating to barriers, energy and surroundings represent an overall consequence 
picture, and hence describe the risk in a better way than before. The challenge is linking the 
factors with their associated weight creating a result which represents a realistic level of 
risk.  
Model 3 summarizes the weighted contribute from each of the factors from the three areas:  
 
                  CS = (∑ wi * fi) energy + (∑ wi * fi) barrier + (∑ wi * fi) surroundings    
 
A narrow weighting range (1- 10) does not reflect each factor’s impact on the final score. 
But a wider range (1- 100) makes the weighting process more difficult. A modification to 
model 3 is necessary when using a narrow range, as the weighting of each parameter will 
not represent the severity of the most significant consequence factors. Accounting for the 
most important groups despite having a narrow range, an additional weighting can be 
performed:  
 
                CS = (∑Wj* wi * fi) energy + (∑Wj* wi * fi) barrier + (∑Wj* wi * fi) surroundings,    
               where Wj is the additional weighting to the group of consequence factors. 
 
The most influential factors are now accounted for in the consequence score and this will 
be the final formula used for model 3. Simple calculation methods and layouts in excel are 
used to create this model, which is illustrated in table 14 (and appendix C). The 
contribution from each parameter is found by filling in 1 (yes) in the column named fi 
(specific consequence factor / parameter) which is multiplied with the associated group 
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weight, Wj, and specific factor weight, wi. Final consequence score is the combined sum 
from energy, barrier and surroundings. 
Factors contributing most to the score are reservoir / injection pressure, flow potential from 
the reservoir and leakage fluid, path and potential rate. These parameters will have the 
greatest influence on the consequences of a well integrity incident, and are given group 
weight (Wj) 10. The amount, rate and type of hydrocarbons flowing out of the well to the 
surroundings will directly decide the impact of an accident. 
Type of installation, installation activity, escalation factors, water depth and source of 
energy are considered less important and given group weight (Wj) 5 and 3.They describe 
how the well / installation can handle a leak, but if the premise to a potential accident is 
missing, there is no point in a large accounting  in the final consequence score.  
The escalation factor group differs from the others due to the possibility of several (or 
none) fill-ins as the well can experience many challenges simultaneously (or none). Group 
weight (Wj) will than multiply with each factor making a well with several issues more 
risky.  
In the next section the model will be tested on different field cases. These wells have the 
same barrier status (orange), but will vary in regards to the consequence factors. Final score 
will hopefully reflect the seriousness of the wells and rank them in a realistic order. The 
lowest and highest possible scores from model 3 are 111 and 820, and the field cases will 
fall between these values.  
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Table 14: Final excel model for consequence categorization. 
 
77 
 
4.3 18BCase study 
 
5 cases of wells within the same barrier status (orange: one failed barrier), but with 
different consequence impact, will now be presented. All have a breach in Statoil’s ARIS R 
– 19678 requirement: “Two independent barrier envelopes against uncontrolled blowout 
from reservoirs shall at all times be in place” and are therefore shut in. They will be run in 
the new system for consequence categorization to check if the system actually finds the 
most critical wells and produce a realistic consequence score.   
 
4.3.1 42BCase 1 
WBS for case 1 is shown in figure 25. Additional well information is listed below: 
• Water injector.  
• Manned platform well.  
• Reservoir pressure ≤ normal (≤ Hydrostatic). 
 
• Well integrity issue: Failed primary barrier (casing to annulus leak below production 
packer). When the well is in operation, there is pressure build up in B – annulus as 
the injected water flows through the failed 9 5/8” casing. When the well is shut in the 
pressure falls to zero, and there has during three years not been registered pressure 
build up in tubing or B - annulus. There is a continuous monitoring of the pressures in 
tubing, A, B and C annuli. 
 
• Risk evaluation: The likelihood of hydrocarbons coming from the reservoir is low 
due to: 
- Perforations are at 2717 m TVD whereas the initial oil water contact (OWC) was 
at 2702 m TVD. 
- Based on a reservoir simulation (seen in figure 24), the current OWC is at 2635 m 
TVD (29). 
- The oil saturation at the upper part of the well (2692 m TVD) is approximately 
30%.   
- However, the simulation cannot exclude the existence of small pockets of 
hydrocarbons not captured in the reservoir model. 
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Based on the performed reservoir simulation showing the presence of hydrocarbons to be 
very unlikely and the evaluation concluding the well does not have any inflow potential 
from the reservoir (continuous pressure monitoring of tubing and annuli shows zero 
pressure build up for three years), this well poses a low risk.  The consequences will be 
small as the reservoir does not have any potential of creating a major accident. 
Table 15 shows the result of the consequence rating for the well. It scores low on every 
factor, except the surroundings contribution. This is because case 1 is a manned platform 
well with high installation activity, which always requires additional attention. The final 
consequence score is 233.…………………………………………………………………….
Figure 24: Reservoir simulation showing present OWC and the position of the well in case 1 (29).  
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Table 15: Consequence score for Case 1. 
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 Figure 25: WBS for case 1 (33) . 
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4.3.2 43BCase 2 
WBS for case 2 is shown in figure 26. Additional well information is listed below: 
• Gas Producer. 
• Manned platform well.  
• Reservoir pressure is abnormal high (HPHT – well). 
 
• Well integrity issue: Deterioration in both primary and secondary barrier 
(insufficient strength of formation at 9 7/8” casing depth, production packer depth 
and the 9 7/8” casing cement is of uncertain quality). Breach in Statoil’s TR – 3507, 
as the requirement for minimum horizontal stress at the barrier elements is not met 
and cement quality not verified. Calculations show minimum horizontal stress < gas 
gradient, but fracture gradient > gas gradient. Logging of the 7” liner cement revealed 
no hydraulic seal behind the liner. The log could not proof good cement in the 9 7/8” 
casing cement either (30). 
 
• Risk evaluation:  The worst case scenario in case of barrier failure is a reservoir gas 
leakage fracturing overburden formation and a subsequent leak to the seabed or to the 
annulus of the platform wells. A study on the potential leak paths for reservoir gas 
and the recipient sands in the overburden has been performed. The conclusion was 
that there is sufficient storage capacity to receive a gas leakage (31). As the formation 
integrity requirement is based on the minimum horizontal stress, (the fracture re - 
opening pressure which is much lower than the actual fracture gradient), it can be 
discussed if the formation integrity will fail due to a gas leakage. The well has been 
assessed to be orange, and not red (dual barrier failure), because of the conservative 
assumptions. However, both the primary and secondary barrier fail to meet minimum 
requirements, and the 9 7/8” casing cement is of uncertain quality. Although the 
probability of the leak passing both barriers is regarded low, the consequences would 
be enormous as it is a HPHT field. A potential blowout would also be hard to kill. 
Table 16 shows the consequence score for case 2. The contribution from each factor is 
high, reflecting the degree of seriousness for the well. As the reservoir has the ability to 
deliver a huge amount of energy which can propagate to seabed or directly on platform 
deck (external surroundings), this well poses a very high risk. This is also reflected in the 
final consequence score which is > three times higher than for case 1, with a value of 735.
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Table 16: Consequence score for Case 2. 
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Figure 26: WBS for case 2 (33) . 
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4.3.3 44BCase 3 
WBS for case 3 is shown in figure 27. Additional well information is listed below: 
• Oil Producer. 
• Subsea well distanced away from installation (tie - back well).  
• Reservoir pressure is abnormal (> Hydrostatic). 
 
• Well integrity issue: Failed primary barrier (oil leakage at approximately 0.8 l/ min 
through production packer into A and B annuli). During operation an increase in A – 
annulus pressure (which was impossible to bleed off in the annulus bleed line) was 
detected and due to holes in tie - back casing the A and B annuli were in 
communication. The pressure is stabilized at a higher value than the C annulus can 
withstand if the leakage should propagate out of the 13 3/8” casing.   
 
• Risk evaluation: Should the 13 3/8” casing not withstand the pressure in B – annulus 
the oil will flow under the 20” casing shoe, which has insufficient strength, and into 
the overlying formation. In worst case scenario the oil could move all the way up to 
seabed due to formation fracturing. However, as the intermediate casing is a part of 
the secondary barrier, it is designed and tested to withstand the high pressure. It shall 
in theory not be exposed for degradation. Due to the fact that this is a subsea well 
distanced far away from the installation, there is no risk related to safety. But a large 
leak would be devastating for the environment, as the well has a high potential of 
delivering huge amounts of oil for a long period of time. There is also an 
unacceptable amount of hydrocarbons stored in the A and B – annulus, which would 
cause pollution if released to the environment. As the wellhead area is subsea there 
are challenges relating to restoring the barrier and to kill the well in a critical 
situation. This makes the well serious in regards to the consequences if there should 
be a leak to seabed, as this can result in severe environmental pollution. Due to the 
lack of monitoring of the B and C annuli on wet trees, a leak propagating outside the 
A - annulus can be hard to track, and the integrity issue therefore has a larger 
associated uncertainty.   
Table 17 shows the consequence score for case 3, where the well gets a high value, 505, 
due to the reservoir performance and escalation factors. As mentioned the well can never 
threaten the safety on an installation, but has the potential to create major environmental 
damage. 
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Table 17: Consequence score for Case 3. 
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Figure 27: WBS for case 3 (33) . 
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4.3.4 45BCase 4 
WBS for case 4 is shown in figure 28. Additional well information is listed below: 
• Oil Producer. 
• Subsea well distanced away from installation (tie - back well).  
• Reservoir pressure is abnormal (> Hydrostatic). 
• Special completion with dual wellbores. 
 
• Well integrity issue: Failed primary barrier (a fish above SCSSV in bore 1 makes it 
inoperative and the control line is exposed to reservoir fluid).The control line is 
isolated with a ROV operated valve in the control module placed on the subsea 
manifold. The leak potential is very limited, as the control line has a small diameter. 
 
• Risk evaluation: If the ROV operated valve fails, there is direct communication 
between the reservoir and seabed through the SCSSV control line. The length of the 
control line (350 m) and the small diameter (3.5 mm) will however give a high 
friction, making the potential leak rate to seabed very small (≤ API RP 14 B criteria). 
Due to the fact that this is a subsea well distanced far away from the installation, 
there is no risk related to safety. The risk associated with environmental damage is 
also low. A leak to seabed would have to move more than 350 m to reach surface, 
and the oil will be significantly spread at shallow depths. This makes the oil 
concentration reaching surface very small. There are no factors potentially escalating 
the integrity issue and the remaining barrier condition has been unchanged for many 
years. The shut in pressure is significantly lower than pressure limit for the control 
line, there is not a large volume of hydrocarbons present in the well and a leak to 
seabed is assessed to be easy to kill. The dual wellbore completion also makes the 
well more robust to integrity issues as there are a several options to solve an integrity 
issue relating to access and reliability of other WBEs. 
Table 18 shows the consequence score for case 4. It scores low on every factor, except 
the energy contribution. As the reservoir has potential of delivering hydrocarbons, the 
risk cannot be negligible. The score, 263, reflects the low degree of impact a leak to the 
surroundings will have both on safety and environment. 
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Table 18: Consequence score for Case 4. 
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 Figure 28: WBS for case 4 (33) . 
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4.3.5 46BCase 5 
WBS for case 5 is shown in figure 29. Additional well information is listed below: 
• Alternating water and gas injector. 
• Subsea well below manned semi – submersible floater.   
• Reservoir pressure is abnormal (> Hydrostatic). 
 
• Well integrity issue: Failed primary barrier (tubing to annulus leak above the 
acceptance criteria below the SCSSV and the 9 5/8” liner cement is of uncertain 
quality).  Corrosion in the tubing has led to a leak into A – annulus of the well below 
the SCSSV. The tie – back PBR is not qualified as barrier element according to 
today’s regulations, and is regarded as a weak link where the leak can propagate to B 
- annulus.  In addition to the failed primary barrier the 9 5/8” liner cement is also of 
varied (uncertain) quality according to cement log (32). The well has been used as 
water injector for the past months and a reflux of gas from the reservoir is regarded 
unlikely.  
 
• Risk evaluation: Worst possible scenario is a leak of gas from the reservoir which 
propagates outside 7” and 9 5/8” liner (or through tubing via A – annulus and PBR) 
reaching the 13 3/8” shoe which cannot withstand today’s shut – in pressure with gas 
gradient all the way up to the shoe (it can withstand the water gradient). Since the 
well has been used as water injector in the past months, it is regarded unlikely that 
gas shall flow into the well. However, as former gas injector, there will always be a 
possibility of reflux from the reservoir (but the gas flow potential is considered 
small). The probability of the leak reaching 13 3/8” casing shoe is also regarded low. 
As the well is subsea positioned under a manned facility, a gas leak reaching the 
floater would be critical. Due to the fact that it is considered to be very unlikely that 
gas will flow from the reservoir, the wellhead is positioned at deep waters (>350 m) 
and the possible leak rate of gas would be small and easy to kill, the risk relating to 
safety is not considerably high. Environmental risk is also small, as a leak of gas to 
seabed would not cause any significant pollution.  
Table 19 shows the consequence score for case 5. It will have a medium impact with score 
396 due to conservative assumptions in the risk evaluation, where worst case scenario 
assumes gas leak with potential of reaching the 13 3/8” casing shoe. As there is a low 
probability of gas flowing from the reservoir, the flow potential and leak rate is assessed to 
be small.…………...…………………………………………………………………………. 
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Table 19: Consequence score for Case 5. 
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Figure 29: WBS for case 5 (33) . 
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4.3.6 47BModel 3 predictions 
 
An evaluation of the model predictions will now be carried out. Its ability to find the most 
critical wells is reflected in the different consequence scores.  
The 5 field cases are rated equally after the previous categorization system, where the 
physical barrier status in the wells directly decides the final risk status code. The 5 cases are 
all orange, as they have a failed barrier or a single failure in the well will result in a leak to 
the surroundings. However, they will pose different levels of risk depending on the 
consequences this leak may have both on safety and environment. This difference in risk is 
shown in the new model for consequence categorization where the wells are ranked in 
following order (1 = most serious): 
 
1. Case 2 with consequence score 735. 
2. Case 3 with consequence score 505. 
3. Case 5 with consequence score 396. 
4. Case 4 with consequence score 263. 
5. Case 1 with consequence score 233. 
 
These results give a good indication of the model’s ability to reflect the seriousness for the 
different wells, as the ranking actually consigns with the risk evaluation for the different 
cases. There have also been performed well specific risk assessments for the 5 cases 
internally in Statoil, and these evaluations support the results found from model 3.   
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4.4 19BFinal model for risk status categorization  
 
The new consequence categorization (model 3) can be combined with the existing barrier 
status codes (seen in table 8). Constructing a matrix with the barrier status on one axis 
(accounts for probability) and the consequence scores on the other (accounts for impact), a 
more complete risk picture will be presented. 
Before constructing the final matrix a division of the scores from model 3 is needed to 
produce different consequence categories (already shown in table 15 - 19). Three groups 
are reflecting the degree of seriousness relating to the impact: 
• Scores < 300: Low impact. 
• Scores between 300 – 500: Medium impact. 
• Scores > 500: High impact.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final matrix for risk status categorization is presented in figure 30. The wells in the 
right upper area of the matrix (with scores > 500 and orange / red on barrier status) are 
considered most critical, needing the first hand prioritization.  
Figure 30: Matrix for final risk status categorization including the 5 field 
cases. 
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4.5 20BDetailed risk assessment for the wells ranked high  
 
Wells ranked high in the new risk categorization system need high management attention 
and additional resources. In the first run a detailed risk assessment must be performed 
finding out if the wells actually pose a higher associated risk than the ones ranked less 
critical. If the latter is a fact, the wells will be first in line for a workover / intervention 
returning them to a healthy state. This means re – establishing the lost barrier(s) by either 
fixing the original issue or by securing the wells with plugs (mechanical or cement).  
As previously discussed, there are different risk assessment techniques for well integrity 
with variation of time effort and complexity. Today Statoil has no fixed standard for a 
detailed risk assessment procedure for the integrity of wells in operation making it difficult 
performing this task. 
A common and easy method frequently used is a risk register table, where all the risks are 
listed one by one. Based on the level of impact and probability, the different risks are 
placed in a matrix showing which are critical and the ones less serious. This method is 
beneficial in the way that it is very easy to use and present, and has a low level of 
complexity. However, by only listing the risks, dependencies are not taken into 
consideration. A major accident is usually a result of the combined effects from many risks 
occurring simultaneously. Therefore, they need to be assessed in combination, and not 
isolated, to represent possible undesirable scenarios.    
As the dual barrier envelopes can be seen as a system preventing hydrocarbons from 
flowing out of the well, a system reliability analysis is suited to assess how robust the 
barriers are when experiencing well element failures. A FMECA is an analysis which 
investigates how a component failure will affect the barrier envelopes. Nor this method 
takes into account dependencies, as it only looks into single component failures and 
isolated effects. 
A fault tree analysis is a more detailed method for system reliability accounting for 
combined effects, as it shows which component failures result in a leak to the surroundings. 
The fault tree creation is time consuming and will require a lot of resources. Making a 
diagram representing all the possible component failures leading to a leak out of the well, is 
a major task. The fault tree may become too complex and hard to create.  
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Statoil’s compliance and leadership model is an easy and understandable method of 
performing a risk assessment before a work task. The advantage of the model is its 
comprehensibility to most people who may not be that familiar to the risk assessment 
discipline and complex analysis methods. A weakness of the model is its generality, as it 
does not say which techniques to use to identify and evaluate the risks before a work task. 
Developing a standard for detailed risk assessment for the most critical wells in operation 
(wells outside the dual barrier criterion ranked high in the new categorization system) can 
simplify the process and save lots of time for Statoil. This thesis suggests some techniques, 
but it is hard finding a perfect tool for assessing the well integrity risk for wells in 
operation. There needs to be a balance in the degree of details in the analysis as the 
complexity will increase when the level of details is high. A method too complex and time 
consuming will never work in practice, but simplifying the analysis can create a wrong 
representation of the true risks. 
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5. 4BCONCLUSION 
 
The existing risk status categorization for wells in operation is based on the NOG 
Recommended Guidelines 117, chapter 4. Although Statoil has developed this system a 
step further with implementing the escalation risks in iWIT, the creation of a system which 
represents the total risk picture in a better way is needed. The existing risk status 
categorization is mainly focused on the physical barrier status in the well hence describes 
the probability of a leak to the surroundings. It does not evaluate the consequences a 
blowout / well release would have for the installation, its personnel and the environment. 
As risk can be described as the combination of consequences of an event and the associated 
likelihood of occurrence of the event, an important part is left out in the status code.   
The scope of this thesis was developing a new system including the consequences in the 
risk status for the wells. This system can be used for further differentiation of the red / 
orange wells (that are outside the dual barrier requirement) with regards to which gets the 
first hand prioritization and resources. 
Most of the wells in the operational phase still have one barrier in place preventing the leak 
from reaching the surroundings. The consequences will therefore be hypothetical relating to 
a potential event resulting from a well integrity issue. The main hazardous event is a 
blowout / well release resulting in a flow of hydrocarbons to the surroundings. Depending 
on a number of factors, the consequences of a blowout / well release will differ from well to 
well. As they are based on an event that has not yet occurred, there will be a large 
associated uncertainty. Most likely it will never happen. However, developing a 
categorization system for the consequences potentially resulting from the well integrity 
issue will help finding the most critical wells - the wells with the largest potential for a 
major well integrity accident. These need the first hand prioritization and resources. 
Returning the most critical wells to a healthy state will reduce the overall risk that affect the 
whole installation, its personnel and the surrounding environment.  
This thesis suggests several systems for consequence categorization, and the one most 
representative is presented as model 3. It is a simple system building on several factors 
which are given different weights according their significance. The model function 
summarizes each factor’s contribute, and produces a final consequence score. This score 
reflects the seriousness in regards to the impact a potential leak would have to safety and 
environment. Model 3 was tested on 5 field cases with the same status code (orange – one 
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barrier failure) according to the existing system for risk classification. The model results 
clearly illustrate how the equal rating of these wells is insufficient, as they actually pose 
very different levels of risk based on the potential consequences. The scores gave a good 
indication of the model’s ability to reflect the seriousness for the different wells, as the 
ranking actually consigned with the risk evaluation for the different cases. Well specific 
risk assessments performed internally in Statoil also support the results from model 3.   
The new consequence categorization (model 3) can be combined with the existing barrier 
status codes (seen in table 8). Constructing a matrix with the barrier status on one axis 
(accounts for probability) and the consequence scores on the other (accounts for impact), a 
more complete risk picture will be presented: 
 
 
It is important to emphasize that the new system shall not undermine the existing regulatory 
requirement that wells with failed barrier(s) must be shut in until the dual barrier envelopes 
are regained. Using a low consequence score as argument for continued production / 
injection could turn into a dangerous trend. This is not the purpose of the new system. It is 
a tool helping the decision makers to determine which wells get first hand prioritization in a 
line of wells that need remediation. Scarce resources make it impossible to perform 
interventions and workovers to re - establish the barrier(s) on all these wells at the same 
time. 
Figure 31: Matrix for final risk status categorization.  
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Although a major well integrity accident in the operational phase has a low associated 
probability, the consequences of such an event would be devastating. Loss of human lives, 
huge environmental damage and great financial losses (potentially destructing the operating 
company in charge) are some outcomes that can result from a major accident. Knowing the 
well integrity risk status at all times is of utmost importance. 
There needs to be an understanding of who is responsible and accountable at each stage of 
the well’s lifetime. The well can change organizations multiple times during its life, and the 
owner needs to be known and accountable at all times. A good process and documentation 
is essential for smooth and accurate handovers between organizations. Having a status 
representing the total risk picture for a well is therefore very important in all stages of the 
wells lifetime allowing the involved parties to understand the risks the wells pose. This can 
help preventing a major ccident. 
  
Figure 32: The importance of having a well – known risk status at all times. 
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6. 5BFURTHER WORK 
 
As there are numerous factors controlling the impact of a potential blowout / well release, it 
is difficult constructing a model capturing all of them. Model 3 is built on a few factors 
considered most important, and they are weighted according to which have the greatest 
influence on the consequences. This weighting is subjective and the values need to be 
adjusted. To construct a more representative model reflecting a realistic consequence 
picture it is essential to have participation from experienced and knowledgeable team 
members from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. As the factors come from different 
areas, several engineers (reservoir, mechanical, process, design, risk) must be included in 
the model development providing a better basis for the assumptions the system is built on. 
The model needs to be tested on a high number of field cases to find out which factors are 
most significant to the consequences. By comparing the results from many wells, it is easier 
to see trends and adjust the model assumptions.  
A standard for detailed risk assessment for the wells that are ranked high in the new risk 
status categorization system is needed to assess if these are candidates for immediate 
workover / intervention operations. This can potentially avoid a major accident resulting 
from an integrity issue. 
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6BAPPENDIX A:  Well barrier elements, functions and failure modes  
 
The table below lists the types of WBEs, with the description of function and typical failure 
modes, which are relevant during the operational phase of a well (4). 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
7BAPPENDIX B: Well barrier elements acceptance tables 
 
The tables below are excerpted from NORSOK D-010 section 15, and contain some of the 
most important WBEs during the operational phase of a well (1).  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
8BAPPENDIX C: Model 3 formulas 
 
 
